The Policy Choices Tribes Face When Deciding Whether  to Enact a Water Code by Clayton, Thomas W.
American Indian Law Review
Volume 17 | Number 2
1-1-1992
The Policy Choices Tribes Face When Deciding
Whether to Enact a Water Code
Thomas W. Clayton
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr
Part of the Indian and Aboriginal Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in American Indian Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information,
please contact darinfox@ou.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas W. Clayton, The Policy Choices Tribes Face When Deciding Whether to Enact a Water Code, 17 Am. Indian L. Rev. 523 (1992),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/4
COMMENTS
THE POLICY CHOICES TRIBES FACE WHEN
DECIDING WHETHER TO ENACT A WATER CODE
Thomas W. Clayton*
Introduction
For many tribes in the West, water rights represent the one resource,
not taken away, that can aid them in economic and social develop-
ment.' At the same time, unquantified Indian reserved rights create a
cloud of uncertainty over the rights of water users under state law,
and threaten the states' ability to oversee further development of their
lands .
2
Like the scope of tribal self-government, the scope of reserved water
rights has come under increasing attack.3 When tribes consider exer-
cising jurisdiction over their water rights through the enactment and
* Member, Gibbs, Feyder, Myers, Peters & Hoffman law firm, Sioux Falls, South
Dakota. J.D., 1992, University of South Dakota. Member, 1992, South Dakota Bar
Association. The author wishes to thank the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation
for providing the funds necessary to research this comment. He also wishes to thank
Frank Pommersheim, Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law, for his
invaluable input.
1. Tribal water rights were first recognized in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908), and are commonly referred to as Winters rights. The Winters doctrine has
come to symbolize the Native American hope to establish an independent and self-
sufficient existence. "My boy is 8 years old; he walks around saying Winters Doctrine.
We understand that." DArnmL MCCOOL, COMMAND Or TIM WATERs 226 (1987) (epigram
quoting Ernest Stevens, Vice President, National Congress of American Indians, at a
1974 hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcom-
mittee of Indian Affairs); see also Walter Rusinek, Comment, A Preview of Coming
Attractions? Wyoming v. United States and the Reserved Rights Doctrine, 17 EcoLoGY
L.Q. 355, 363 (1990) (Winters doctrine has been praised as "a Magna Carta for the
Indian") (quoting Norris Hundley, Jr., The Dark and Bloody Ground of Indian Water
Rights: Confusion Elevated to Principle, 9 W. HIsT. Q. 454, 463 (1978)).
2. Comment, Indian Reserved Rights: The Winters of Our Discontent, 88 YALE
L.J. 1689, 1690 (1979); FRANK J. TRm.EAsE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATiONs iN WATER LAW
128-30 (National Water Commission Legal Study No. 5, 1971) [hereinafter TREEAsE,
FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS]; Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 623 n.15 (1983)
(Arizona II) (quoting Report from Simon Rifkind, Special Master to the Supreme Court
in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Arizona 1) at 263-64 (Dec. 5, 1960)).
3. See Rusinek, supra note 1, at 400-03 (scope of water rights); Thomas W.
Clayton, Note, Brendale v. Yakima Nation: A Divided Supreme Court Cannot Agree
over Who May Zone Nonmember Fee Land Within the Reservation, 36 S.D. L. Rnv.
329, 351 n.262 (1991) (scope of self-government).
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enforcement of tribal water codes, a challenge to both the extent of
the water right and the scope of jurisdictional authority may be
anticipated.
4
This comment identifies the issues that tribes face when deciding
whether to enact a comprehensive water code. It begins with a brief
overview of water law affecting tribal authority over reserved water
and other water within the boundaries of the reservation.5 It focuses
on the jurisdictional issues that arise when a tribe attempts to enforce
its water code. It then identifies precedents that have and will continue
to shape a tribe's jurisdictional authority. Finally, it provides guidelines
that will assist tribes in enacting and enforcing effective tribal water
code(s).
I. Winters Rights: An Historical Overview
Tribal water rights stem from two sources.6 One is through historical
use that predates the creation of the reservation. 7 Tribes that have
historically relied on water for fishing developed an aboriginal right
to an amount of water necessary to preserve their fishing economy.8
The other source, most familiar to plains and desert tribes, is the
agreement or treaty that established the reservation. 9 The seminal case
4. See e.g., In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big
Horn River System, Nos. 91-83, -84, -91, -92, -93, -94, -96, -97, 1992 WL 119212 (Wyo.
June :5, 1992) (Big Horn II) (the Wind River Reservation tribes could not "call" their
quantified Winters rights water to maintain in-stream flows for their fishery - a valid
use under the tribal water code - since the treaty quantifying the right did not include
such use and Wyoming state law did not recognize the instream flow as a beneficial
use of water). For a discussion of Big Horn II, see infra notes 210-28 and accompanying
text.
5i. Indian reservations include land and resources held in trust by the United States
for the benefit of Indian tribes, separate and apart from the public domain. Such
reservations were created through treaties with tribes or by Executive Orders.
6. A third source stems from Spanish law, where certain pueblos in southwestern
Ameria were granted rights by the Crown in the early 1400s. FEux S. COHEN,
HADIWooK OF FEDERAL IND LAW 580 (2d ed. 1980) (citing New Mexico v. Aamodt,
537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977)).
7. See generally United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (treaties reserve
Indian rights not granted to the United States); William H. Veeder, Indian Prior and
Paramount Rights of the Use of Water, 16 RocKY MTN. Mm. L. INsT. 631 (1971).
8. Cf. Confederated Colville Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). See generally Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110
(1983); CoHEN, supra note 6, at 442-43.
9. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (federal government withdrew
land mid water rights from the public domain and exchanged them with the Assiniboine
and Gros Ventre tribes in consideration for their agreement to remain within the
boundaries of that land and become a "civilized and pastoral people"); COHEN, supra




of Winters v. United States0 pronounced the reserved rights doctrine.1'
There, the Supreme Court held that the agreement reserving a home-
land for the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine tribes - the Fort Belknap
Reservation - impliedly reserved an amount of water necessary to
ensure that the land would be economically productive for agricultural
use.' 2 However, the Court was unclear as to whether the tribes or the
United States originally owned the water that provided the "benefit
of the bargain" which validated the treaty.
First, the Court stated that the tribes ceded vast amounts of land
and water in exchange for protection of their sovereign dominion over
the land and water they reserved for themselves.' 3 Second, it found
that the reserved right arose from the government's power to withhold
water from the public domain, which was then given to the tribes in
exchange for their agreement to remain within the reservation bound-
aries. 4 At any rate, the contract creating the reservation is not affected
by the opinion's ambiguity as to which entity originally owned the
water. Indian reserved water rights arise from the tribes' exchange of
promises with the United States creating the reservation and are an
10. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
11. Id. at 576-77.
12. Id. at 575-76.
13. Id. at 576. The Court stated:
The lands ceded were, it is true, also arid; and some argument may be
urged, and is urged, that with their cession there was the cession of the
waters without which they would be valueless, and "civilized communities
could not be established thereon." And this, it is further contended, the
Indian knew and yet made no reservation of the waters.... The Indians
had command of the lands and the waters, - command of all their
beneficial use, whether kept for hunting, "and grazing roving herds of
stock," or turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give
up all this? Did they reduce the area of their occupation and give up the
waters which made it valuable or adequate? ... The government is
asserting the rights of the Indians.
Id. (emphasis added). Later in its opinion, the Court cited United States v. Winans,
198 U.S. 371 (1905). In Winans, the Supreme Court found that a treaty "was not a
grant of right to the Indians, but a grant of right from them, - a reservation of those
not granted." Winters, 207 U.S. at 578 (quoting Winans, 198 U.S. at 381).
14. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. "The power of the government to reserve the waters
and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied, and could not
be." Id.; see U.S. CONSn. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see also COHEN, supra note 6, at 576.
Under this analysis, the United States took the land and water from the tribes and
then gave it back. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). The Court
cited contract law as the source of the right. Winters, 207 U.S. at 577. In the contract,
the government reserved the land and water in exchange for the tribes' cession of vast
tracts of land or their prerogative to roam them. Id. ("That the government did reserve
them we have decided, and for a use which would necessarily continue through years.
This was done May 1, 1888, and it would be extreme to believe that within one year
Congress destroyed the reservation and took from the Indians the consideration of their
grant, leaving them a barren waste .... ).
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aspect of federal, not state, law.3 The Winters doctrine marked a clear
departure from the federal government's policy of deference to state
water laws.' 6 The Supreme Court made it clear that the state never
"owned" the water that became the benefit of the bargain between
the United States and the tribes.'
7
A. Indian and Federal Reserved Law v. State Water Law
The differences between Indian and derivative federal reserved water
law, embodied in the Winters doctrine, and state water law are sig-
nificant. First, Indian reserved rights are the source of federal reserved
water law, separate and distinct from state law that controls the right
to use state-controlled water.' Second, under the Winters doctrine,
the amount of water that is reserved is the amount necessary to meet
the present and future needs of the reservation(s).' 9 Under state prior
appropriation law, the amount of water that one may use is limited
to that amount which is put to present use.20 Third, there is no need
to actually use the water in order to maintain rights to it.21 The western
states' prior appropriation doctrine holds that in order to maintain
rights to water, it must be diverted and put to beneficial use.2 Fourth,
Indian reserved water rights have a priority date as of the establishment
of the reservation.2 Under state prior appropriation law, a user's
priority date is established either at the date that a permit is filed or
the date that the water is diverted and put to beneficial use, whichever
is sooner. 24 Fifth, and most significant, the Winters doctrine articulates
15. See COHEN, supra note 6, at 576.
16. States were officially authorized to define the rights of water users within their
borders by the Supreme Court in California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 164-65 (1935). One commentator noted that while the
Supreme Court had affirmed Congress' ability to regulate state-owned, non-navigable
wate: when it was essential to preserve the beneficial use of federal government property,
such as navigable waters, see United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174
U.S. 690 (1899)), the Court had also confirmed that the states controlled non-navigable
waters within their boundaries in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S 46, 94 (1907). MCCOOL,
supra note 1, at 46. McCool also noted that Winans could have been interpreted as
placing Indian reserved water out of the reach of both federal and state control. Id.
He concluded that "mT1he Court could have gone in any number of directions." Id.
Congress' policy of deference, however, was pervasive. Id. at 49-50.
17. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-77.
r8. CoHEN, supra note 6, at 576.
19. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (Arizona ); McCooL, supra
note 1, at 45.
20. McCooL, supra note 1, at 45.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 575-77 (1908).
24. DAVm H. GErcHas, WATER LAW IN A NuTsrnLL 93-99 (1984) [hereinafter
GETcnms, NuTrsHELL] (relation-back doctrine).
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sovereign ownership of water. By contrast, the various state doctrines
determine individual ownership of water. As such, Winters rights
should not be compared solely to individual users' rights, but also to
state sovereign ownership of water.
However, tribal reserved water rights are not entirely divorced from
state law.2 The tribes' reserved rights are located on the state-law time
line that distinguishes senior from junior appropriators. 26 As such,
tribal reserved rights are subject to other users who have a priority
earlier in time under state law. As a practical matter, tribal reserved
rights are rarely, if ever, usurped by senior appropriators. Because
tribes are generally the senior water rights holders in any given water
system, and because Indian reserved water rights have not been exten-
sively quantified, great uncertainties arise over the amount of water
reserved to the tribes and the amount of water left for the states to
administer for economic development and growth.27
B. Quantification of Winters Rights
1. Purpose of the Reservation
Quantification of Indian reserved water rights involves an exami-
nation of the purpose for which the reservation was created.2 This
entails a study of the agreement, 29 treaty,30 or executive order3 that
25. CoHEN, supra note 6, at 576 ("Indian water rights cannot be understood apart
from the prior appropriation system, recognized in one form or another in all of the
mainland western states.").
26. Id.
27. Joint Statement of Department of Water Resources of Arizona, Colorado River
Board of California, and Colorado River Commission of Nevada on House Bill 2642
Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives (Sept.
16, 1987), in Natural Resources Law Ctr., Natural Resource Development in Indian
Country (University of Colorado School of Law Ninth Annual Summer Program, June
8-10, 1988). The statement said:
[U]ncertainty as to the magnitude of Indian water rights claims if and
when they will actually be exercised makes administration of rights difficult
and subjects long standing junior appropriators to having their use cut
back or terminated, disrupting the economies they represent. This is an
unavoidable consequence of the Winters right generally.
Id.
28. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) (the purpose of the agreement
which established the reservation was to provide the tribe with an agricultural economy);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596 (1968) (Arizona 1) (the five reservations along
the Colorado River were established to facilitate Indian agriculture).
29. Winters, 207 U.S. at 575.
30. In re Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 76, 95-99 (Wyo. 1988)
(Big Horn 1) (examination of the Second Treaty of Fort Bridger revealed that the
purpose for establishing the Wind River Reservation was to create an agricultural
community), aff'd by an equally divided Supreme Court per curiam, 492 U.S. 406,
reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989).
31. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 596 (the Chemehuevi, Cocopah, Yuma, Colorado River,
and Fort Mohave reservations were created by executive orders for the purpose of
establishing an agricultural economy).
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established the reservation. From a tribal point of view, the purpose
of the reservation is to provide the tribes with an inviolable permanent
homeland.3 2 Under the "homeland" purpose of the reservation, water
reserved would include amounts for agriculture, livestock, domestic
and municipal use, mineral development, industrial and other business
use, wildlife, recreation, fishing, religious purposes, and aesthetic en-
joyment.1
3
Courts have not construed the purpose of the reservation so broadly,
however, and have limited quantification to the purpose for which the
federal government, and not the tribes, established the reservation.
4
That purpose, invariably, was to "civilize" the tribes by supporting
and encouraging agricultural activities. 31 However, a narrow construc-
32. Confederated Colville Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981)
(executive order creating the reservation was to provide a home for the tribes); see
Treaty with the Sioux, Apr. 29, 1868, art. 15, 15 Stat. 635, 640 ("The Indians herein
named agree that when the agency-house or other buildings shall be constructed on the
reservation named, they will regard said reservation their permanent home, and they
will make no permanent settlement elsewhere.") (emphasis added).
33. See Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 98-99. This list includes, but is not exclusive of,
the uses to which water could be put in conjunction with establishing a permanent
homeland.
34. See id. (Wyoming Supreme Court rejected the United States government's claim
that water was also reserved for instream fisheries, mineral and industrial development,
and municipal, domestic, commercial, livestock, wildlife, and aesthetic purposes). See
supra notes 29-33 (describing the singular purpose of the agreements, executive orders,
and treaties that established the reservations as agricultural).
35. See Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 95-98. The Wyoming supreme court cited various
portions of the Treaty with the Shoshones and Bannacks, particularly article VII, to
support its holding that the Wind River Reservation was an "agricultural reservation."
Id. at 95 (citing Treaty with the Shoshones and Bannacks, July 3, 1868, art. 7, 15 Stat.
673, 675). The court also cited article XII, which purported to award $500 annually to
the tribes' ten best farmers, to support its contention. Id. at 96 (citing Treaty with the
Shoshones and Bannacks, July 3, 1868, art. 12, 15 Stat. 673, 676). The court summed
up its analysis as follows:
Article 7 [of the treaty] refers to "said agricultural reservations." Article
6 authorizes allotments for farming purposes; Article 8 provides seeds and
implements for farmers; in Article 9 "the United States agreed to pay each
Indian farming a $20 annual stipend, but only $10 to 'roaming' Indians;"
and Article 12 establishes a $50 prize to the ten best Indian farmers. The
treaty does not encourage any other occupation or pursuit. The district
court correctly found that the reference in Article 4 to a "permanent
homeland" does nothing more than permanently set aside lands for the
Indians; it does not define the purpose of the reservation. Rather, the
purpose of the permanent-home reservation is found in Articles 6, 8, 9,
and 12 of the treaty.
Id. at 97. Here, the canons of construction, which were established to contravene the
government's superior bargaining power, negotiating skills, and knowledge of the lan-
guage, were noted but not followed. See CotEN, supra note 6, at 222 ("In construing
Indian treaties, the courts have required that treaties be liberally construed to favor
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/4
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tion of the reservation's purpose does not necessarily result in quan-
tifying a significantly less amount of water. 36 It has, however, been
utilized to prevent tribes from employing their Winters rights to pur-
poses not originally articulated in the contract creating the reserva-
tion.
37
2. Method of Quantification: "Practicably Irrigable Acreage"
The actual method for quantifying the amount of water reserved
for agricultural purposes was introduced in Arizona v. California.8 In
Arizona, the United States government asserted the claims of five
Indian reservations to water in the Colorado River. 9 The special
master4° determined that the purpose for creating the five reservations
along the Colorado River was to facilitate agricultural development. 41
In order to objectively calculate that amount, he multiplied the number
of acres on the reservation that could sustain crops by the amount of
Indians, that ambiguous expressions in treaties must be resolved in favor of the Indians,
and that treaties should be construed as the Indians would have understood them.");
see also Walton, 647 F.2d at 47 (canons of construction were applied in interpreting
the executive order creating the reservation).
The Wyoming court's finding that water was reserved solely for agricultural purposes
tracked United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The New Mexico Court
held that the amount of water reserved to the federal government was only that amount
necessary to ensure that.the original purpose of the reservation was not defeated. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700. Secondary purposes do not fall within the scope of the
federally reserved water right, and the federal user must follow state law in order to
obtain water for those purposes. Id. at 702. For a full discussion of New Mexico, see
infra notes 60-105 and accompanying text.
36. The difference is significant where the reservation does not contain a great
amount of practicably irrigable acreage (PIA) and where the tribe has a specific, present
need for a large quantity of water for other purposes. See David M. Dornbusch, The
Wind River Litigation: Effects of the Wyoming Supreme Court's Decision on the Wind
River Reservation's Water Use and Implications for Other Reservation Water Rights at
7, in Natural Resources Law Ctr., Natural Resource Development in Indian Country
(University of Colorado School of Law Ninth Annual Summer Program, June 8-10,
1988) ("Using PIA as the exclusive measure of the tribes' water rights resulted in a
reasonable water rights quantification in Wind River, because the Reservation has such
a large irrigated agriculture requirement, and the non-agricultural claim was only 4
percent of the irrigated claim."). However, if a tribe's reservation is predicated on an
agricultural purpose but the reservation contains little or no practicably irrigable acreage,
the tribe may not receive sufficient water to serve either its present or future needs.
37. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, Nos. 91-83, -84, -91, -9Z, -93, -94, -96, -97, 1992 WL 119212, at *3 (Wyo.
June 5, 1992) (Big Horn fl).
38. 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (Arizona 1).
39. Id. at 595.
40. The special master was appointed by the court to organize the evidence and
recommend solutions to the various issues raised.
41. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 596.
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waiter required to grow them.42 This method became known as the
"practicably irrigable acreage" (PIA) standard.
lie determined, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the standard
must be able to quantify sufficient water to meet both the present and
future needs of the tribes based on the requirements of their existing
resources.43 The PIA standard met those requirements. First, it pro-
vided a fixed amount of water that could be put to use for a palpable,
then-extant agricultural purpose." Second, it "feasibl[y] and fair[ly]" 45
quantified a sufficient amount of water to fulfill future as well as
present needs. Third, this objective method avoided awarding specu-
lative, insupportable amounts and provided the certainty that the states
sought. In a subsequent opinion, the Supreme Court confirmed that
tribes could apply water to functions other than agriculture if they
chose to, even though the water had been quantified under the PIA
standard."
The PIA standard was resisted by the state of Arizona. 47 Arizona's
attorneys argued that the master should award an amount of water
necessary to satisfy the "reasonably foreseeable needs" of the tribes.
48
This amount was calculated by multiplying the number of tribal mem-
42. Id. at 600.
43. Id.; see also ComN, supra note 6, at 589.
44. See CoHEN, supra note 6, at 589.
45. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 601.
46. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979). In his report to the Supreme
Court in the first Arizona opinion, the master stated:
[The fact that the PIA standard was employed to quantify the extent of
the tribes' water right] does not necessarily mean, however, that water
reserved for Indian Reservations may not be used for purposes other than
agriculture and related uses .... The measurement used in defining the
magnitude of the water rights is the amount of water necessary for
agriculture and related purposes because this was the initial purpose of
the reservation, but the decree establishes a property right which the United
States may utilize or dispose of for the benefit of the Indians as the
relevant law may allow.
Rifkind, supra note 2, at 265-66, quoted in Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton,
647 F.2d 42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (although the Winters
right was quantified under the PIA standard grounded in the executive agreement
establishing the reservation, upon petition the court permitted the tribes to use such
water for an instream flow to promote their salmon spawning industry); see also CoHEN,
supra- note 6, at 592-93 (Department of the Interior has determined that Indian reserved
rights may be used for any beneficial purpose). The inability to sell water off-reservation
is the main exception to tribes' right to beneficially use their water. As Big Horn II
demonstrates, however, any tribal use' that infringes on existing state-sanctioned uses
are strongly resisted by the state. In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water
in the Big Horn River System, Nos. 91-83, -84, -91, -92, -93, -94, -96, -97, 1192 WL
119212, at *1-4 (Wyo. June 5, 1992) (Big Horn 11).
4.7. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 596-97.
4.l Id. at 600-01.
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bers by an amount of water that each would need.49 The Supreme
Court rejected this standard, stating that it unfairly eliminated the
amount of water necessary for future uses.
50
Arizona also urged the Supreme Court to oversee an "equitable
apportionment" proceeding between the state and the tribes.51 The
Court rejected this alternative on the ground that the proceeding
applied to states only, and that reservations were not states.
52
C. Damage Control: Reducing the Amount
of Indian Reserved Rights
As soon as the pervasive effect that Indian reserved rights posed to
non-Indian users was recognized, 3 the states and Supreme Court en-
deavored to synthesize those rights with the realities of Western de-
velopment and scarcity resulting from that development.
54
Following Arizona, the Supreme Court responded to the states' fears
that Indian and other federal reserved water rights caused uncertainty
for current users under state law, and undermined development and
growth. First, it narrowed the source of federal reserved water rights
to the specific purpose for which the reservation was created. 55 Second,
after a twenty-year battle 6 the Court broadened the "McCarran
Amendment ' 5 7 to enable states to join tribes in state-court river system
49. Id.
50. Id. at 601.
51. Id. at 596-97. "Equitable apportionment" refers to the Supreme Court pro-
ceeding, based on original jurisdiction, to resolve disputes between the states. See Kansas
v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907). See generally A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of
Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U. CoLo. L. REV. 381
(1985). Arizona's lawsuit against California was an equitable apportionment proceeding
to resolve each state's claim to a share of the Colorado River under the Colorado River
Compact of 1922. Arizona 1, 373 U.S. at 550-51.
52. Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 597.
53. See A. Dan Tarlock, One River, Three Sovereigns: Indian and Interstate Water
Rights, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 633, 636 (1987) [hereinafter Tarlock, One River]
("Potential Winters rights claims in Arizona alone stand at 31.3 million acre-feet, many
times the state's share of the Colorado River.") Legend has it that Los Angeles would
not have built its aqueduct siphoning the Colorado River had it known that the
reservations along the river would be awarded one million acre-feet of water. See
TRELEAsE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATiONs, supra note 2, at 129. The full amount of disrup-
tion that will be caused by quantification of Indian reserved rights has never been
calculated. Id. at 128.
54. Tarlock, One River, supra note 53, at 658.
55. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 (1976); United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 (1978).
56. PETER W. SLY, RESERVED VaaE RIGHS SETTLEMENT MANUAL 10 (1988).
57. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1988). The McCarran Amendment was enacted in 1953,
permitting states to join the United States as a party in order to adjudicate rights on a
river system where the United States had complied with state law for the use of water.
As such, it contemplated waiver of sovereign immunity only where the United States
acted as a private water user, not as the owner of a federal reserved right.
No. 2]
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adjudications to resolve uncertainties concerning water available for
river basin appropriations. 58 Finally, the Court has proceeded on an
ad hoc basis to prevent requantification of Indian reserved rights when
those rights were incorrectly tabulated, through either unavoidable lack
of hformation or governmental incompetence, in the original adjudi-
cation.
59
1. Narrowly Construing the "Purpose of the Reservation":
Federal Reserved Rights
In United States v. New Mexico' the Supreme Court resolved a
dispute over the extent of federal reserved rights in the Gila National
Forest. The Court focused its attention on the users under state law
who faced dislocation due to the creation of federal reservations and
the water they consumed. 6' Specifically, the Court held that only the
primary purpose for creating a federal reservation was relevant when
deteimining the extent of the reserved right and if secondary purposes
conflicted with a primary purpose, those purposes did not give rise to
a reserved right and state law must be followed in appropriating water
to satisfy state interests.6 The Court found that when Congress passed
the Organic Administration Act of 1897,63 it impliedly reserved water
necessary to preserve the Gila Forest's watershed and timber producing
capability." It found that in securing favorable conditions for water
flows, Congress intended to ensure that appropriators under state law
would receive the most water that the forest would yield year after
year.
65
When Congress enacted a second law, the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960," for the additional purposes of providing recreation,
range production, and adequate habitats for wildlife and fish in na-
tional forests, those purposes were secondary to the primary purposes
enunciated in the Organic Administration Act. 67 The Rio Mimbres
513. See e.g., United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971);
Colorado River Cons. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Arizona v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983).
59. See e.g., Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983) (Arizona 1); Nevada v.
United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983). See generally Roger Florio, Note, Arizona v.
California: Finality as a Water Management Tool, 33 CATH. U.L. Rnv. 457 (1984).
60. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
61. Id. at 706 ("To the anguish of Western settlers, reservations were frequently
made indiscriminately.").
62. Id. at 702, 715.
63. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 34 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 473-482 (1985)) (Organic Administration Act).
64.. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707.
65. Id. at 715.
66. Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1992)).
67. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 714-15.
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River, flowing from the Gila National Forest, was completely appro-
priated. This elevated secondary purposes to the status of a reserved
right (governed by 1960 priorities) resulting in a "gallon-for-gallon
reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy state and
private appropriators.' '68
In reaching its decision the Court distinguished between the pri-
mary and secondary purposes of each act and then focussed its inquiry
on the legislative histories of the respective acts. First, the Court found
that secondary purposes defeated the primary purpose of securing
favorable water flows for downstream use and, secondly, that the
legislative history of the Multiple-Use Act revealed that the expanded
purposes were to be "supplemental to, not in derogation of" the
purposes elicited from the Organic Administration Act. 69 Finally, the
Court determined that Congress did not intend to reserve water for
those conflicting secondary purposes. 70
In reality, the Court did not deny a reserved right for the "second-
ary" purposes found in the 1960 Multiple-Use Act because they con-
flicted with those of the 1897 Organic Act. Those purposes did not
and were not intended to conflict with the earlier Act. 71 Rather, the
Court denied a reserved right for those purposes because they conflicted
with water appropriators under state law .2 In essence, Congress' ad-
ditional purposes prevented state and private appropriators from max-
imizing their use of the water.
As a result, New Mexico is memorable in two ways. First, its dictum
advanced the misconception that Indian reserved rights are subsumed
68. Id. at 705.
69. Id. at 714.
70. Id. at 715.
71. A comparison of the language and purposes reveals that it was possible to
preserve the watershed and also reserve water for recreational, range, and fish and
wildlife purposes without creating a conflict. Id. at 713. The 1960 Multiple-Use Act
fully intended that the purposes would complement each other rather than conflict. The
Act reiterated the purposes of the earlier 1897 Organic Act and specifically stated that
the new purposes were supplemental to, and not in conflict with, the original purposes.
The Act states:
It is the policy of Congress that the national forests are established and
shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,
and wildlife and fish purposes. The purposes of sections 528 to 531 of
this title are declared to be supplemental to, but not in derogation of, the
purposes for which the national forests were established as set forth in the
[Organic Administration Act of 1897].
16 U.S.C. § 528 (1976), quoted in New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713.
72. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 715. The Court stated: "A reservation of additional
water could mean a substantial loss in the amount of water available for irrigation and
domestic use .... " It concluded that this "defeat[ed] Congress' principal purpose of
securing favorable conditions of water flow." Id.
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by the federal reserved rights doctrine.73 Second, it enunciated the
Supreme Court's paramount interest in protecting appropriators under
state law when federal reserved rights pose a threat to their water
supply. 74 This has subsequently become known as the "sensitivity
doctrine."
75
While New Mexico involved only federal reserved water rights, there
was no attempt on the part of the Court to distinguish Indian reserved
water rights from federally reserved water rights. Rather, the decision
lumped the two together. 76 Consequently, Indian reserved water rights
are drawn into the web spun by these decisions, which were crafted
in response to states' fears that quantifying great amounts of federally
reserved water would hinder state economic development and growth.
By falling to distinguish between Indian and federal reserved rights,
the Supreme Court has sanctioned state adjudicatory proceedings that
ignore substantial distinctions only to minimize or eliminate portions
of the Indian reserved right.7 The differences between Indian and
federal reserved rights are numerous.
'73. Id. at 698-99. "Substantial portions of the public domain have been withdrawn
and reserved by the United States for use as Indian reservations, forest reserves, national
parks, and national monuments." Id. at 699. The opinion further identified Indian
reserved rights with the "appurtenance" requirement enunciated in Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), concerning federal reserved rights. Id. at 700 (citing
Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138). The fact that the Colorado River was appurtenant to the
five Indian reservations in Arizona I has also added to this misconception. See New
MexWo, 438 U.S. at 700 (citing Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 595-601); see also Winters v.
United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
74. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 705 ("[The possibility that federal reserved rights
may reduce the water available for state and private appropriators] must be weighed in
determining what, if any, water Congress reserved for use in the national forests.").
75. Id. at 718 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the Court that the implied-
reservation doctrine should be applied with sensitivity to its impact upon those who
have obtained water rights under state law and Congress' policy of deference to state
law.").
76. Id. at 698-99, 700; Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138 ("[W]hen the Federal Government
withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the
Goveinment, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. ... The doctrine applies
to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves .... ).
77. See William H. Veeder, Indian Water Rights in the Concluding Years of the
Twentieth Century 34-44 (The Newberry Library, Center for the History of the American
Indian, Occasional Paper Series, 1982) (the United States Justice Department's failure
to distinguish between Indian and federal reserved water rights resulted in state juris-
diction to adjudicate Indian reserved rights under the McCarran Amendment); cf. In re
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, Nos.
91-83, -84, -91, -92, -93, -94, -96, -97, 1992 WL 119212, at *2 (Wyo. June 5, 1992)
(Big HForn 1D) (Wyoming Supreme Court accepted the opportunity to apply federal
reserved rights doctrine to the Indian reserved rights doctrine to reject tribal "call"
pursuant to a tribal code for a use not permitted under state water law).
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2. Indian Reserved Rights Versus Federal Reserved Rights
First, Indian reserved rights accrue from the treaty or agreement
which created the reservation. In Winters, the Supreme Court viewed
the agreement that established the reservation as a contract between
the United States and the tribes. 8 The Court explored the intent of
both the tribes and the United States when it determined that the
agreement had impliedly reserved sufficient water to fulfill the agri-
cultural purpose of the reservation.
79
Other treaty language has been interpreted by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Confederated Colville Tribes v. Walton. 0 In
Walton, the court scrutinized the "executive agreement" that created
the reservation and treated it as though it were also a contract. 81 This
inferred that the United States' trust responsibility to the tribes required
such an interpretation.
On the other hand, New Mexico involved an inquiry into Congress'
intent only, because in those cases statutes were the source of the
federal reservations. 2 As such, Indian reserved rights providing for
tribal homelands were not established in the same manner as federal
reserved rights for the purpose of preserving national forests83 and
monuments. 4
This crucial distinction, of the bilateral agreement between sovereigns
as opposed to a unilateral action on the part of Congress, goes to the
heart of the nature of the right. Indian reserved rights are reserved
for people, whereas federal reserved rights are reserved for federally
owned property management. The failure of the United States Justice
Department to maintain this distinction85 has resulted in a narrowing
78. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); see Rusinek, supra note 1,
at 365-66 (the result of a bilateral agreement, a treaty should be analyzed to include
the intent of the tribe as well as Congress when determining the purpose of the
reservation).
79. Winters, 207 U.S. at 575-76 ("It was the policy of the government, it was the
desire of the Indians ..... ).
80. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
81. Id. at 47.
82. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1978); Cappaert v. United
States, 426 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1976).
83. See United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520, 523 (1971)
(United States reserved water for proper management of the White River National
Forest); New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707-08 (United States reserved water to protect the
watershed and provide for timber growth in the Gila National Forest).
84. See Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 142 (United States reserved water for Devils Hole
Monument in order to preserve desert pupfish habitat).
85. See Veeder, supra note 77, at 42. Veeder stated that the Justice Department's
failure to distinguish between Indian reserved rights and federal reserved rights in its
briefs in the Eagle County litigation directly enabled the Colorado Supreme Court, and
later the United States Supreme Court, to consider them both as federal reserved rights.
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of the scope of the right, as well as state jurisdiction to determine the
extent of that right.86 It has also enabled at least one state to intrude
on sovereign tribal regulatory authority to determine the uses to which
quantified Winters rights will be put.87
Second, the states do not benefit from Indian reserved rights as they
do from federal reserved rights. 8 States cannot tax the trust property
that the water is applied to,89 or Indian personal property that applies
the water,90 nor can the states tax Indian income derived from use of
the water on reservation lands. 91 On the other hand, states can and
do benefit from the use of federal reserved water. 92 For example,
private interests harvest the timber from national forests and use
federal lands for grazing cattle.93 Those interests are taxable at the
state level for sales and income earned from such activities.
Id. As a consequence, Indian reserved rights were subject to adjudication in state court
proceedings as a subset of federal reserved rights. See Colorado River Water Conser-
vation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 810-11 (1976); Arizona v. San Carlos
Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 556-57 (1983).
86. See San Carlos, 463 U.S. at 566 n.17. The Court stated:
[The tribes' arguments that the McCarran Amendment waived United
States sovereign immunity, but not tribal sovereign immunity] suffers from
the flaw that, although the McCarran Amendment did not waive the
sovereign immunity of Indians as parties to state comprehensive water
adjudications, it did (as we made quite clear in Colorado River) waive
sovereign immunity with regard to the Indian rights at issue in those
proceedings.
Id. As such, by subsuming Indian reserved rights to an overarching federal reserved
rights doctrine, the Court was able to distinguish between jurisdiction over the right
and jurisdiction over the person. As a result, the Court was able to overlook the fact
that people, not trees or pupfish, are the ultimate users of Indian reserved rights. It is
akin to stating that in rem jurisdiction does not affect the owner of the res because he
does not have to show up in court.
87. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System, Nos. 91-83, -84, -91, -92, -93, -94, -96, -97, 1992 WL 119212 (Wyo. June
5, 1992) (Big Horn I).
We are persuaded by United States v. New Mexico... wherein the United
States Supreme Court held that water is impliedly reserved only to the
extent necessary to meet the primary purpose(s) for which a reservation is
made .... We hold that the Tribes ... must comply with Wyoming
water law to change the use of their reserved future project water from
agricultural purposes to any other beneficial use.
Id. at *4.
811. See Michael Lieder, Comment, Adjudication of Indian Water Rights Under the
McCarran Amendment: Two Courts are Better Than One, 71 GEo. L.J. 1023, 1053-54
(1983).
89. CoHNa, supra note 6, at 405.
90. Bryan v. Itasca, 426 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1976).
91. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
92. See Lieder, supra note 88, at 1054.
93. Id. at 1054 n.245.
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Third, water reservations necessary to fulfill unilateral federal pur-
poses are supplied from appurtenant sources. 94 The amounts necessary
to satisfy the purposes of Indian reservations, however, cannot be
restricted to appurtenant sources without, in certain instances, decreas-
ing the amount of the entitlement and imposing great hardship.95
Further, the western states themselves by necessity have done away
with the appurtenance requirement.9 "Appurtenance" is a requirement
of riparian lawn that would foreclose development of the West if
adhered to.98 The only purpose for imposing this discriminatory re-
quirement on Indian reservations is to minimize the Winters right. In
fact, the appurtenance requirement underscores the true difference
between Indian and federal reserved rights, and why they should be
treated separately: The primary beneficiaries of Indian reserved rights
are the people who live on the reservation and whose uses are subject
to change. The primary beneficiaries of federal reserved rights are
either natural resources and wildlife with needs unchanged for centu-
ries, or people who live off the reservation."
Fourth, Indian uses consume much more water than federal reserved
rights. It is easy to emphasize "minimal need"'1° and survival amounts'01
when the reserved water is used to protect a narrow scientific purpose'02
or serve the needs to maintain property. 103 However, when a community
plans on using an amount of water that is presently fixed but must
sustain them forever,104 such an emphasis is not only inappropriate, it
is reminiscent of the tattered assimilation and termination eras of
bygone years.
Finally, the United States bears a trust responsibility to the tribes
that it does not owe to its federal land reservations. To fulfill that
responsibility, it is charged with protecting the tribes from overweening,
94. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 (1978) (citing Cappaert v.
United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976)).
95. For instahce, the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Sioux Indian Reservations, located
within the state of South Dakota, may not have sufficient quantities of water within
their boundaries to satisfy the extent of their entitlement. The "appurtenance" require-
ment would result in unfair hardship to those reservations, especially considering that
the Rosebud Reservation was once appurtenant to the Missouri River. See Rosebud
Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
96. See Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 443 (1882); Irwin v. Phillips,
5 Cal. 140 (1855).
97. GErcHEs, NuTsmLt, supra note 24, at 28.
98. See generally Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
99. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 696; Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, 136.
100. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141.
101. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700.
102. Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141.
103. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707.
104. See United States v. Nevada, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
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intrusive state actions that encroach on tribal property or self-govern-
ment.1
05
In sum, when the distinctions between Indian and federal reserved
rights are blurred, the amount of the Indian reserved rights can only
be decreased with the consequence that the tribes must rely on state
law to augment their share. This means that tribes become subject to
state jurisdiction, if there is room at the end of the priority line for
diverting water and if their initial entitlement is not enough to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation. Such a result can only undermine tribal
sovereignty.
D. The New Policy: Settlement of Indian Reserved Rights
The current Department of the Interior policy focuses on the ne-
gotiation and settlement of Indian reserved rights claims rather than
litigation. 106 The purpose of settling claims rather than litigating them
is to save costs and avoid the uncertainties inherent in the trial proc-
ess.l
One commentator stated that the Department's focus on saving the
cost of adjudication does not benefit the tribes. 10 Rather, such cost-
saving benefits the Department to the detriment of the tribes. 109 Placing
the Department's interests ahead of the tribe's connotes a breach of
fiduciary duty. Settlement of Indian water rights may not be less
expensive than a general adjudication because tribes must still be able
105. See, e.g., Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
105. Eileen Shimizu, Indian Water Rights: An Examination of the Current Status
of the Department of Interior's Guidelines and the Opposition to Them, 38 FED. B.
NEws & J. 88, 88 (1991) (citing Criteria and Procedures for Indian Water Rights
Settlements, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (1990)). The guidelines were shaped by presidential
proclamation when President Bush signed the Puyallup Tribe of Indians Settlement Act
of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-41, 103 Stat. 83 (codified at 25 U.S.C.S. § 1773a-j (Law.
Co-op Supp. 1992). President Bush stated that disputes regarding Indian water rights
should be resolved through negotiated settlements rather than litigation. Id.
Since 1983, the Department of the Interior has been encouraging settlement through
a "carrot" approach. See SLY, supra)note 56, at 92 n.88. Sly noted that as a rule, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) will not pay for outside tribal counsel. Id. (citing 25
C.F.R. § 89.40). However, private attorney fees may be paid if the BIA and the tribe
deterines that a "substantial possibility of a negotiated settlement exists." Id. (quoting
25 C.F.R. § 89.41(e)).
107. But see Shimizu, supra note 106, at 89-90. Shimizu stated that the Department
of the Interior's criteria for determining whether to negotiate or litigate essentially
revolve around saving the time and cost of litigating. Id. at 90. She noted that the only
beneficiaries under these rules are the states and the federal government. Id. The
proposed criteria for determining whether settlement negotiations should be entered into,
or continued after they have been initiated, should include whether settlement negotia-
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to prove the full extent of their practicably irrigable acreage in order
to support their bargaining stance and maximize the amount of the
entitlement.
The settlement process may result in a lesser entitlement than ad-
judication would achieve. 110 However, diminishment of a Winters claim
is not the automatic result of such a negotiation."' Further, tribes
110. See Tarlock, One River, supra note 53, at 663. Tarlock stated that the efficacy
of exchanging Winters rights for the actual delivery of watef depended on the individual
agreement. Id. The Navajo-New Mexico water settlement agreement called for the Navajo
Nation to waive its Winters rights in return for the construction and actual delivery of
a certain amount of water. Id. The waiver may be limited to the tribe's rights to water
out of the Navajo reservoir and its tributaries, which permits the tribe to pursue other
sources to fulfill the rest of its entitlement. Id. The Colorado-Ute agreement is similar.
The Ute tribes exchanged some of their Winters entitlement for actual delivery of water
from off-reservation projects. Id. at 668-69. However, if the projects are not completed
as planned the tribes are free to pursue their full entitlement through adjudication. Id.
at 669.
111. Where states perceive a community of interest with tribes, negotiations can
result in benefits to both parties. See Marcia Beebe Rundle, The Montana Reserved
Water Rights Compact Commission at 1, in Natural Resources Law Ctr., Natural
Resource Development in Indian Country (University of Colorado School of Law Ninth
Annual Summer Program, June 8-10, 1988) (under the Fort Peck agreement, "the
parties institutionalized communications between the governments, created a structure
to resolve disputes over water uses, and established a process for cooperative management
and joint leasing of shared water resources.").
The Fort Peck agreement provided the tribes with 1.05 million acre-feet. Tarlock,
One River, supra note 53, at 667. The tribes originally maintained that they needed
over two million acre-feet. Minutes of the Eleventh Meeting, Montana Reserved Water
Rights Compact Commission 2 (Feb. 5, 1982), quoted in John P. Guhin, The Law of
the Missouri, 30 S.D.L. Rav. 347, 472 (1985). The total amount is based on the number
of practicably irrigable acres within the reservation, although apparently only one half
of the acres are owned by the tribes or Indians. Id. Of that amount, a maximum of
950,000 acre-feet may be diverted from surface sources, including the Missouri River;
the balance of the entitlement may be satisfied from groundwater sources. Rundle,
supra, at 11-12. Thus, for settlement purposes groundwater is recognized as a legitimate
source for satisfying the Winters rights.
The pact provides for the protection of a small amount of preexisting state and
federal uses from a potential tribal call, based on its date-of-the-reservation priority.
Id. The pact also sanctions off-reservation marketing of reserved water with the option
of state participation in a joint water-marketing plan. Id. at 13; Tarlock, One River,
supra note 53, at 667. To date, however, the Montana congressional delegation has not
been able to achieve Congress' approval of this portion of the agreement. Steven J.
Shupe, Off-Reservation Marketing of Indian Water at 6, in Natural Resources Law
Ctr., Natural Resource Development in Indian Country (University of Colorado School
of Law Ninth Annual Summer Program, June 8-10, 1988).
Administration of the respective water rights is specified in the agreement. For a
discussion of jurisdictional issues in the context of negotiated settlements, see infra notes
333-47 and accompanying text.
Finally, the agreement paved the way for the Department of the Interior approval of
the tribes' water code. SLY, supra note 56, at 155. For a discussion of the Department
of Interior's moratorium on approval of tribal codes, see infra notes 388-99 and
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
540 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
may benefit from exchanging Winters rights for other valuable consid-
erations."
2
Tribes and states are able to resolve complex and extremely sensitive
issues relating to jurisdiction over water users,"3 availability of ground-
accompanying text.
The Fort Peck agreement was partly the result of Montana's desire to keep as much
water as possible within the borders of its State. See Tarlock, One River, supra note
53, at 666; see also Guhin, supra at 472. Looking forward to an equitable apportionment
of the Missouri River, the state has decided to join with the tribes in its state to protect
each party's respective rights. Montana is among the most liberal states in the West
conceinng its recognition of beneficial uses. Unlike any other state in the Missouri
basin, Montana recognizes that recreation and fish and wildlife consume water for
beneficial purposes. GErcans, NUSHELL, supra note 24, at 102.
At least one other state has expressed its disapproval of Montana's strategy and
skepti.ism as to its ability to succeed. See Guhin, supra at 475. The disagreement may
be resolved by an equitable apportionment proceeding that removes quantified Indian
rights from the amount of water available in the Missouri River prior to the state-by-
state allocations. Under this procedure, state bordeis will ultimately hold the sum of
both the Indian reserved and state apportioned amounts. However, the total amount
that eich state will receive will be proportionally reduced by the total amount of Indian
reserved rights to the Missouri River. This way, Indian reserved rights will be deducted
from all the basin states, not only the states which contain reservations. Essentially, all
states, not only states having reservations within their borders, will be responsible for
living up to the nation's treaties.
If Indian reserved rights are not deducted from the amount of the river subject to
apportionment beforehand, then the gross amount that each state receives will be larger.
However, tlhat gross amount will be subsequently reduced in order to satisfy the Indian
reserved rights within each state. This results in an unfair burden to the states having
reserva.tions within their borders, and unfair benefit to lower basin states which do not
contain reservations or which have enough rainfall that tribal needs are not critical.
South Dakota's policy assumes that the river will be apportioned without removing
Indian rights beforehand. As a result, South Dakota intends to minimize Indian reserved
rights before and after any apportionment proceeding in order to maximize the state's
amount. See Guhin, supra at 476; see also John H. Davidson, Address on Native
Ameri an Law Day, Vermillion, S.D. (Apr. 7, 1989); in IssuEs AND DEVELOPMENTS IN
INILAN WATER LAW 25-26 (1989).
112. The quality of the representation and the relative bargaining powers of each
party will affect the final outcome of a negotiated settlement. See Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. 110; Shimizu, supra note 106, at 90.
113. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text (discussing the Fort Peck and
Colorado Ute agreements). Most agreements resolve the issue of jurisdiction to hear or
review disputes by referring to "courts of competent jurisdiction." SLY, supra note 56,
at 155-56. This inevitably implies federal and state court jurisdiction, but not necessarily
tribal court jurisdiction. See Rundle, supra note 11l, at 14-15. Winters rights settlements
and adjudications underscore the necessity for tribal enactment of water codes to
administer water rights, regulate competing uses, and adjudicate disputes between users.
See generally Frank Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of
Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 ARiz. L. RaV. 329 (preservation of tribal sovereignty depends
on the enactment of laws that secure the just and equitable treatment of everyone within
the reservation). Without an effective tribal water code, disputes involving tribal members
will be settled in a nontribal forum.
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water to satisfy tribes' water entitlements," 4 delivery of reserved water
from federal projects after it has been quantified,"
5 shortage sharing," 6
off-reservation marketing of water," 7 and new or altered uses that
directly affect other users under different jurisdictional regimes.", In
sum, every issue that can be litigated can also be settled. The most
important prerequisite is the perception by each party that negotiating




Where one appropriator is using an amount of water to the detriment
of the other, quantification of Winters rights is helpful in determining
the relative priorities in time of the users.'2 However, quantification
will not resolve every conflict between member users and non-Indian
users on fee lands within the reservation.' 2 ' For instance, quantification
114. See Tarlock, One River, supra note 53, at 647-48 (in its settlement, the Papago
tribe released any claims to groundwater in exchange for delivery of surface water to
satisfy its reserved rights); Rundle, supra note 111, at 11 (Assiniboine and Gros Ventre
tribes may use groundwater to augment their reserved right); cf. In re Rights to Use
Water in Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 76, 99-100 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn 1) (groundwater
is not included in the Arapahoe and Shoshone tribes' adjudicated entitlement), aff'd by
an equally divided Supreme Court per curiam, 492 U.S. 406, reh'g denied, 492 U.S.
938 (1989).
115. See SLY, supra note 56, at 29 (discussing Colorado-Ute settlement requiring
delivery of quantified right from two federal projects in Southwest Colorado); see also
Tariock, One River, supra note 53, at 663-64, 668-70 (discussing Navajo-New Mexico,
Ute-Utah, and Colorado-Ute settlements).
116. See Shimizu, supra note 106, at 90.
117. See SLY, supra note 56, at 30 (discussing Fort Peck Agreement permitting off-
reservation marketing of Indian reserved water with notice and state benefit-sharing)
(citing Lee Herold Storey, Leasing Indian Water off the Reservation: A Use Consistent
with the Reservation's Purpose, 76 CALn. L. REy. 179 (1988); David H. Getches,
Management and Marketing of Indian Water: From Conflict to Pragmatism, 58 Coao.
L. REV. 515 (1988)) [hereinafter Getches, From Conflict to Pragmatism].
118. See SLY, supra note 56, at 156 (under the Fort Peck Agreement, tribal transfers
of water rights are subject to review in the state's water courts); see also Rundle, supra
note 111, at 14 (under the Fort Peck Agreement, the tribe and state agree to exchange
information regarding new or changed uses on a quarterly basis).
119. John A. Folk-Williams, The Use of Negotiated Agreements to Resolve Water
Disputes Involving Indian Rights, 28 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 63, 71 (1988).
120. The tribal user, with a priority date as of the date of the reservation, will have
a superior right to a nonmember user under state law.
121. As testament to the true complexity of the subject, quantification settles the
issue of how much water the tribe is'entitled to, but not necessarily the source of water
the tribe may tap to satisfy its entitlement. See In re Rights to Use Water in Big Horn
River, 753 P.2d 76, 100 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn 1) (tribes may not use groundwater to
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will not resolve conflicts over priorities of uses between nonmembers
and members.'" Further, many tribes have not quantified their Winters
rights. Tribal governments have the authority to regulate the use of
water by Indians on tribal lands pursuant to validly enacted water
codes.'1 Their ability to regulate the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within the reservation, however, is another matter,
Jurisdiction to regulate the uses and quality of water within tribal
borders is discussed below. First, the section explores tribal regulatory
jurisdiction following the adjudication of Winters rights (proprietary
jurisdiction). Second, it discusses the resolution of jurisdictional issues
satisfy their quantified amount), aff'd by an equally divided Supreme Court per curiam,
492 U.S. 406, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989). It is conceivable that a state court
may attempt to require a tribe to explore sources outside of the reservation to satisfy
its entitlement even though there is a sufficient supply within the reservation, if non-
members using water on fee lands under state permits would be disrupted in their use.
12:1. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn
River System, Nos. 9.1-83, -84, -91, -92, -93, -94, -96, -97, 1992 WL 119212, at 3-4
(Wyo. June 5, 1992) (Big Horn I1) (adjudication of Indian reserved water rights delineates
the limits of legally permitted uses for such water; a tribal water code providing for
uses not included in the treaty or document creating the reservation will not be respected
by the state engineer who monitors the adjudication decree if such uses are not included
in the treaty under which the right was quantified, unless the tribe applies for a permit
and the use is recognized as a beneficial use under state law).
For example, a nonmember irrigator is diverting water from a creek on the Rosebud
Sioux Reservation under a state permit. His diversion causes the creek to run dry. The
nonmember's conduct is "beneficial" under state law, and does not conflict with other
beneficial uses; South Dakota does not recognize uses that benefit wildlife, promote
aesthetics, or involve maintaining instream flows. Here, quantification will not provide
the tribe with the means to enjoin the nonmember's activity. On the other hand, the
tribe could enact a water code which states that priorities of use include promoting
wildlife, aesthetics, and maintaining instream flows. As a result, its Office of Water
Resources could require that the nonmember stop diverting water from the stream and
instead obtain his water from a well that is deep enough to avoid disrupting the stream's
hydrological relationship to the Ogallala Aquifer.
123. See CoHEN, supra note 6, at 232-37, 246-52 (sovereignty provides a traditional
basis for tribal authority to regulate the conduct of its members within the reservation;
tribes have the authority to choose and organize their form of government, to legislate,
and to administer their laws). Tribes retain all sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty,
congressional statute, or precedent. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 313 (1978).
While congressional enactment of Public Law 280 transferred criminal and civil juris-
diction to certain states, regulation of Indian trust water rights was specifically excluded
from state jurisdiction. SLY, supra note 56, at 73 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1982)).
Tribes also share the authority to administer irrigation water with the Secretary of the
Interior when the project is within their borders. Joint Bd. of Control v. United States,
832 F.2d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1987) (construing 25 U.S.C. § 381 (1982)). However, the
ability of tribes, who formed their governments under the Indian Reorganization Act,
to enforce water codes has been frustrated by the Department of the Interior's mora-
torium on the approval of such codes. For a discussion of the moratorium, see infra
notes 3118-99 and accompanying text.
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through the negotiated settlement of such claims. Finally, the section
addresses tribal enforcement of a water code without quantification
(territorial jurisdiction).
Jurisdiction over water, particularly over nonmember users on fee
lands within the reservation, has developed its own case law. These
opinions have emanated from the Ninth Circuit and are not binding
outside of its respective boundaries. However, these cases are persua-
sive and may be followed in other circuits.
There are many variables involved. First, the user must be defined.
Users within the reservation include: (1) the tribe on trust land or
allotment land held in trust; (2) the tribe on "disestablished" land
reacquired from non-Indians; (3) individual tribal members and other
Indians on allotment land; (4) non-Indian purchasers of allotment land
("Walton users"); and (5) non-Indian purchasers of "surplus" reser-
vation land, or fee land.
Second, ownership of the water must be determined. Whether or
not the Indian right has been quantified, both tribal and state water
may exist within the borders of the reservation. This occurs where
there is sufficient water on, under, or flowing through the reservation
to satisfy the Indian entitlement plus an amount of "excess" water,
to which the state claims ownership. 24 Where there is no quantification,
the existence of non-Indian users is seen as de facto evidence of state
water ownership. 12
Third, where "excess" water exists on the reservation, the tribe's
interest in maintaining unified jurisdiction over the waters within its
borders is weighed against the state's interest in regulating water used
by nonmembers on fee lands.'2 The extent to which the adjudicated
124. See United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984); Holly v. Totus,
655 F. Supp. 548 (E.D. Wash. 1983) (Holly 1), rev'd sub noma. Holly v. Watson Totus,
749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984), on remand sub nom. Holly v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of Yakima Nation, 655 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (Holly I1), aff'd sub
nom. Holly v. Totus, 812 F.2d 714 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 823 (1987).
125. Telephone Interview with Jim Goodman, Water Engineer, Department of En-
vironment and Natural Resources, South Dakota (June 26, 1991) (South Dakota requires
non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation to apply for a state permit to use water).
126. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 51-53 (1981); Anderson,
736 F.2d at 1363-66; Holly II, 655 F. Supp. at 558-59. The courts followed an orthodox
pattern of applying Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), to the tribe's
interests in jurisdiction over nonmembers' use, followed by a preemption analysis of
the state's assertion of jurisdiction. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448
U.S. 136 (1980).
Following Montana, the Court in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), eliminated the preemption analysis and
focused entirely on whether the tribe had any legitimate authority to regulate the conduct
of nonmembers on fee lands. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 455-57 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(Montana reversed the presumption of tribal regulatory jurisdiction over conduct on fee
lands to a presumption of state regulatory jurisdiction).
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water system transcends the reservation's boundaries determines, in
large part, the state's interest in jurisdiction over nonmembers' use
within the reservation.' 27
A. Regulatory Jurisdiction After the Right Has Been Adjudicated
The most recent quantifications of Indian reserved rights specify
whether the tribe or state has authority to administer the respective
water rights.'2 Administration or monitoring refers to the determina-
tion of whether there is a sufficient quantity of water to serve all the
competing users. While the administration of rights is an aspect of
regulatory jurisdiction, regulation of water quality and enforcing pri-
orities of uses are different topics that cannot be resolved by quanti-
fication.1 29 Below are cases dealing with the enforcement of water
rights when tribal and nonmember uses conflict, and tribal assertion
of authority to regulate uses that violate code provisions.
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton'30 involved the Colville tribes'
attempt to prevent Walton, a non-Indian purchaser of allotment lands,
from using surface and groundwater in a water system wholly contained
within the reservation.' 31 Walton had applied for permits to use water
under state law and was using the water on allotment parcels. 32 The
trial court quantified the tribes' entitlement from the No-Name Creek
Basi by using the PIA standard.' 3  It found that the tribes were
entitled to 666.4 of the 1000 acre-feet in the system; the balance
constituted "excess" water that non-Indians on fee land were entitled
to appropriate.'3
127. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1366. The issue here is not whether Indian use has a
"spillcver" effect off the reservation. Cf. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983). Rather,
the issue involves pure prior appropriation law: whether junior appropriators within the
reservation must be regulated to protect the interests of downstream senior appropriators.
Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1361.
128. See In re Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 76, 114-15 (Wyo.
1988) (Big Horn 1) (Wyoming state engineer may enforce Indian reserved rights against
non-Indian users), aff'd by an equally divided Supreme Court per curiam, 492 U.S.
406, r4h'g denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989). Phase III of the Big Horn litigation will
determine the rights of non-Indian users within the reservation. Included will be a
determination of the jurisdictional limits of both the state and the tribes to enforce
their respective water codes.
129. In fact, the Wyoming Supreme Court applied aspects of the quantification
phase of the Big Horn litigation to undermine tribal sovereign authority to enforce the
Wind River Water Code's regulation of beneficial uses. See In re General Adjudication
of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, Nos. 91-83, -84, -91, -92, -
93, -94, -96, -97, 1992 WL 119212, at *3-4 (Wyo. June 5, 1992) (Big Horn 11).
130. 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
131. Id. at 44-45, 52.
132. Id. at 45.
133. Id.
134. Id. The quantification was not limited to surface water only, but also included
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/4
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first determined that Walton,
as a purchaser of allotted lands, was entitled to a reserved water
right.1'5 Next, the court addressed the issue of which government had
the authority to regulate the use of a non-Indian purchaser of an
allotment. It held that, considering the fact that the water system was
entirely contained within the reservation, only tribal law applied. 36 As
such, Walton's state permits were void and the state had no regulatory
authority within the basin.
3 7
In support of its ruling, the court found that the state was preempted
from exerting its regulatory authority in this instance.' First, it found
groundwater. Id. The court refused to award the tribes additional water to maintain
their fishery. Id. at 46. However, the trial court did grant the tribes' separate motion
to use their agricultural entitlement to support spawning in No Name Creek. Id. The
tribes subsequently pumped groundwater, as part of their agricultural entitlement, into
the creek during spawning season. Id.
The Ninth Circuit applied the "specific purpose" test, propounded in New Mexico,
in order to determine the extent of the tribes' water entitlement. Id. at 47. It found
that the specific purpose of the reservation was to provide a home for the tribes. Id.
The Colville Reservation was established by Executive Order. Id. at 44. The court noted
that Indian reservations were "created for the Indians, not for the benefit of the
government." Id. at 47. This was a radical departure from other courts' focus on the
government's purpose for establishing reservations; namely, to "civilize" tribes; pressing
an agrarian life on them to achieve this purpose. See Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 575-76 (1908). In order to satisfy that purpose, the tribes were entitled to
water for agriculture and for maintenance of their traditional fishing vocation. Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-48 (1981). However, the Ninth Circuit
did not award any more water for maintaining the fishery. Id. at 48. It held that the
method of quantifying the right, the PIA standard, did not limit the uses to which the
tribes could put the water. Id. As such, the tribes received their entitlement of reserved
water for the fishery from the district court's decree based on the PIA standard. Id.
Further, the Walton court did not disturb the lower court's finding that state water also
existed in the basin. Id. at 46.
135. Walton, 647 F.2d at 50. "Because the use of reserved water is not limited to
fulfilling the original purposes of the reservation, Congress had the power to allot
reserved water rights to individual Indians, and to allow for the transfer of such rights
to non-Indians." Id. at 49. After examining the general purpose of the Dawes Act, it
concluded that Congress intended this. Id. The original allottee received a proportion
of the reserved water in the basin that corresponded with the percentage of irrigable
acreage that he owned, which he was free to sell to the non-Indian purchaser. Id. at
50, 51 (citing United States v. Athtanum Irrigation District, 236 F.2d 321, 342 (9th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957)) (non-Indian purchasers of allotted land are
permitted to "participate ratably" with Indian allottees in the use of reserved waters).
The non-Indian purchaser was entitled to the lesser of (1) the original allottee's ratable
share, or (2) the amount of water that the Indian allottee was actually using at the time
of the sale plus an amount that the purchaser appropriated with "reasonable diligence"
after title passed. Id. at 51. The purchaser was entitled to a date-of-reservation priority,
and was susceptible to losing his right due to nonuse. Id.
136. Id. at 51.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980)).
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that state regulation would infringe on tribal self-government. 39 Citing
Montana v. United States,14° the court found that "[riegulation of
water on a reservation is critical to the lifestyle of its residents and
the development of its resources. Especially in arid and semi-arid
regions of the West, water is the lifeblood of the community. Its
regulation is an important sovereign power.'
4'
Second, the state was preempted from issuing permits to use the
excess water because the system was located entirely within the reser-
vation; as such, there was no impact on state water rights off the
reservation. 42 Finally, concurrent state and tribal regulation would
result in the same type of confusion that Congress sought to avoid
when it deferred to state water law on nonreservation land. 143 Although
this two-step "preemption" test is no longer applied - the court does
not consider whether the state is preempted, since state regulatory
jurisdiction over nonmember conduct on fee land is now presumed' 44
- the Montana test focusing on whether tribal interests are sufficiently
threatened to justify regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers' use of
water may remain valid.' 45
In sum, the Walton court held that non-Indian purchasers of allot-
ment land, or "Walton users," were entitled to the same ratable share
of reserved water that the original allottees were granted and were
subject to tribal regulatory jurisdiction. 46 Further, the "excess" water
was also subject to tribal regulation due to the unique hydrological
and geographical circumstances of the basin.
47
Another case from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals further
defined the contours of tribal regulatory jurisdiction. United States v.
Anderson'48 involved the determination of water rights to a basin not
139. Id. at 52.
140. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
141. Walton, 647 F.2d at 52 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
142. Id. at 53.
14z1. Id. The fact that Walton was not using a state resource, but a tribal resource,
never entered into the court's preemption analysis.
144. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 409 (1989) (Supreme Court applied a "changed circumstances" test
involving such factors as the prevalence of fee lands, non-member population, and
county government services to determine whether the tribe or the county had regulatory
zoning authority over non-members on fee lands within the reservation). Unlike zoning,
however, the regulation of water is not built out of conflicting civil views toward land
use and development. Like fish and game, water is a palpable, renewable resource. As
such, it has the distinction of being both an object of regulation and the guiding force
and perhaps ultimately the main limitation of a community's growth.
145. See supra notes 256-60 and accompanying text.
146. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1981).
147. Id. at 52.
148. 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1983).
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entirely contained within the reservation, as was the case in Walton.149
The adjudication of the Chamokane Basin system included the Cha-
mokane River, tributaries, and connected groundwater.",, Regulatory
jurisdiction over the basin was also at issue.
The Spokane Indian Reservation, like many reservations, was
"squared" for allotment and opened for settlement under the Dawes
Act. '5 Some parcels were acquired under the Homestead Act, 52 others
were allotted, and most of the land was reacquired by the tribe and
returned to trust status.' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the priority dates and regulatory issues that arose from this
history.
First, the court held that where the tribe reacquired "surplus" land
- land sold through the Homestead Act - and that land carried a
perfected water right under state law, the tribe obtained a state water
right with a priority date as determined by state law.' The court
found that once the land was severed from the reservation and sold
as part of the public domain, any reserved rights were also severed
and lost forever.155 The tribe, as subsequent purchaser, also purchased
any attached water right. 56 Second, where it reacquired surplus land
with no water right or an abandoned right, the priority date was held
to be the date of reacquisition, not the date of the reservation." 7 The
court found that the tribe's purchase under this circumstance was
analogous to creating a new reservation. 58 Third, where the tribe
reacquired allotment land from non-Indians, the priority date was the
date of the reservation. 59 The court determined that if the Walton
users lost any part of their reserved right, that right was also lost to
the reacquiring tribe. 60
Next, the court addressed the jurisdictional dispute between the tribe
and state. As in Walton, it applied Montana to determine whether the
tribe's interests were sufficiently threatened to invoke administrative
and regulatory jurisdiction.' 6' It found that the tribe's interest in
protecting its water rights from encroaching non-Indians did not trans-
late into jurisdiction over non-Indians because (1) the right was quan-
149. Id. at 1361.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 217, 35 Stat. 458.
153. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1361.
154. Id. at 1361, 1363.
155. Id. at 1362-63.
156. Id. at 1363.
157. Id. at 1361.
158. Id. at 1363.
159. Id. at 1361-62.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1364-65.
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tified, and (2) a federal water master was appointed to administer the
competing rights according to their priority. 62 As a result, it held that
the state could administer non-Indians' use of "excess" or nonreserved
water on fee lands within the reservation. 63 The master, not the state,
would be in charge of shutting off water used by the tribe on reacquired
surplus land with an attached state water permit.
The court next found that the state was not preempted from juris-
diction over non-Indians who used excess water on fee lands within
the reservation.'" It found that "[tihe weight of the state's interest
depends, in large part, on the extent to which waterways or aquifers
transcend the exterior boundaries of Indian country.' 6- It found that
the Chamokane Basin uses affected fee users both on and off the
reservation, whereas Walton involved only allotment purchasers within
a hydrological basin entirely contained by.the reservation.'"
Since the river in question originated outside the reservation, abutted
it for only a short distance, and then departed to flow into the Spokane
River, a physical contrast with the facts in Walton was also manifest. 67
Because of this, the court held that the state had a legitimate interest
in regulating the use of non-Indians that did not infringe on the tribes'
healt h or welfare.'" Further, because a federally appointed water
master monitored the adjudicated rights, the tribes' interest in regu-
lating all users on the Chamokane River within the reservation was
not as critical as in Walton.
69
In sum, the state had the authority to issue and enforce its permits
for excess water within the reservation. The source of the authority
arose from the existence of excess water, the hydrological circum-
stances, and potential effect on non-Indian users off the reservation,
but not from the mere issuance of permits or the user's non-Indian
status.
162. Id. at 1365.
163. Id. The court noted that the state should issue permits for excess water only.
Id. If the state issued permits for nonexistent excess water, the loss was to be borne by
the permittee. Id. However, four years earlier the Walton court observed that unused
Indian reserved water was available for appropriation by non-Indians. Colville Confed-
erated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1981). It is unclear whether the state
of Washington, when it issues permits, distinguishes between "excess" water and unused
Indian reserved water. Such a distinction would put non-Indian users on notice that
their water may be called at a later date, creating certainty by permitting such users to
invest accordingly.
164. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1365-66. The court took note of the federal government's
basic deference to state water law, then distinguished Walton by comparing the users
and basins in adjudication. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.





In Holly v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 70 the federal district court held that the tribe's assertion of
"territorial" jurisdiction over all water users was not sufficient to
confer regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian users of excess water
within the reservation.17' The water rights in question had been adju-
dicated more than fifty years ago, under the assumption that the
appurtenant land was properly opened for non-Indian settlement. 72
Subsequent litigation proved that the United States had erroneously
deeded this land. 73 Some of the land was returned to trust status, but
the vast majority remained in non-Indian hands and the tribes were
awarded compensatory damages.174 In its water code, the tribe asserted
that all of the water within, underneath, or flowing through the
reservation was reserved for the use of their members.175 Since the
tribes' government was revitalized under the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934, its constitution stipulated that enacted ordinances required
approval by the Department of the Interior. 76 The tribes' water code
was not approved because pressure from various state organizations
caused the Department to impose a moratorium on approvals, pending
the adoption of regulations governing tribal water codes.'"
The tribes nonetheless attempted to enforce the code against non-
Indians using excess water within the reservation. 78 In its first holding,
the district court denied tribal regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians
due to the nonseverability of a clause providing criminal penalties for
code violations, *not because the code had not received Department
approval. 79 In an iunpublished opinion, 1 0 the Ninth Circuit remanded
the case for further deliberations.'
8'
In its second opinion, the district court again held that the tribes
did not have sovereign regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian users
of excess water simply because they resided within the borders of the
reservation.8 2 Basing its conclusion on Montana, the court found that
non-Indians' use of excess water did not threaten or directly affect the
170. 655 F. Supp. 557 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (Holly I1).
171. Id. at 559.
172. Holly v. Totus, 655 F. Supp. 548, 551-52 (E.D. Wash. 1983) (Holly 1).





178. Id. at 550. The existence of excess waters was stipulated to by the parties.
Holly v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 655 F. Supp. 557,
559 n.2 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (Holly I).
179. Holly 1, 655 F. Supp. at 553.
180. 749 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1984).
181. Holly II, 655 F. Supp. at 577.
182. Id. at 559.
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tribe's political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare.' It
found that the non-Indians maintained a "peaceful co-existence" with
Indian users and the tribes.'1 As such, the tribes did not possess
"territorial" jurisdiction based on Montana.'5 Further, the court held
that since the non-Indians were not using Indian reserved water, the
tribes could not assert proprietary jurisdiction.
8 6
In In re Rights to Use the Water in Big Horn River (Big Horn 1),187
the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed that the Shoshone and Arap-
ahoe tribes were entitled to 477,000 acre-feet of surface water under
the PIA standard. 8 8 The lower court ruled that the state engineer had
the "primary regulatory responsibility" for administering the adjudi-
cated decree. 89 The United States government argued that either the
tribes or a special master should administer the decree.90 The Wyoming
Supreme Court upheld the state engineer's authority to administer the
decree against non-Indians. The state water engineer was given au-
thority to enter the reservation in order to monitor private appropri-
ators' uses to prevent their infringement on tribal users. 19' In conjunction
with this authority, the water engineer may also "incidentally monitor"
tribal use of "excess" water. 92 He was not given authority to physically
shut off the gates of tribal members who may be using more water
than their entitlement. 9 3 Rather, he could only observe the violations
and file suit on behalf of the state to enjoin them. 194 He did have
concurrent authority to shut off non-Indians' gates upon determining
that they were infringing on tribal reserved rights. 95
The Big Horn I court found that state administration of reserved
water rights was not preempted by federal law. 96 However, the
McCarran Amendment did not directly mandate state administration.9 7
181. Id. at 558-59.
184. Id. at 559.
185. The court specifically refused to determine whether the state or the federal
government had the authority to regulate lands using "excess" water. Id. at 559-60.
186. Id.
187. 753 P.2d 76 (WVyo. 1988), aff'd by an equally divided Supreme Court per
curiam, 492 U.S. 406, reh'g denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989).
188. Id. at 101, 105-06.
189. Id. at 114.
190. Id. at 114-15.





196. Id. at 114.
197. Id. at 114-15; cf. Holly v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation, 655 F. Supp. 557, 560 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (Holly II) (the McCarran Amendment




Yet in this case, it was possible that the state could adequately ad-
minister the decree because the United States admitted that an inde-
pendent water master could adequately enforce the decree in lieu of
the court itself, through the appointment of a special master.198 Ap-
parently, this left the door open for the appointment of any appropriate
person to administer the decree, including Wyoming's water engineer.
Where users under state law encroach on Indian reserved rights, the
Big Horn I court specified that the tribes must first lodge a complaint
with the state engineer.' 99 If he does not satisfactorily protect their
rights, the tribes may then file suit in court- to enjoin the uses. 2°°
However, where the state engineer is granted authority to administer
the respective water rights rather than a United States water master,
a jurisdictional time bomb is created.
In In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in
the Big Horn River System (Big Horn 1/),201 the Wyoming Supreme
Court expanded the water engineer's narrowly circumscribed authority
to merely administer or monitor the amounts of water that each
governmental entity was entitled.? The Court held that the water
engineer must not comply with a tribal "call" for water to be used
for a legitimate tribal purpose if water was not originally reserved for
that purpose and the use is not recognized under Wyoming state law.203
The Shoshone and Arapahoe tribes enacted an interim water code
to regulate their adjudicated entitlement in Big Horn L204 Among the
legitimate uses under the code was the maintenance of an instream
flow to maintain a fishery and provide for groundwater recharge and
water recreation.2 In order to implement this use, the tribes made a
"call" to the engineer to provide sufficient adjudicated water to fulfill
this use.m Enforcing the call would potentially require the engineer to
shut off water supplied to nonmember users since the tribes' right to
the water was superior in time.
The engineer refused.2 The tribes, in compliance with Big Horn I,
filed a complaint in state district court requesting that the engineer be
held in contempt and that he be replaced with a special master.2 The
198. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d at 115.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Nos. 91-83, -84, -91, -92, -93, -94, -96, -97, 1992 WL 119212 (Wyo. June 5,
1992).
202. Id. at *5-6.
203. Id. at *5.




208. Id. at *2.
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district court held that the tribes' use was legitimate and enforceable;
the tribes were not required to comply with the strictures of Wyoming
state law.209 It also removed the state engineer as administrator of all
the parties' water rights and replaced him with a tribal administrator.
210
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court. 21' It held
that the tribes were restricted to using their adjudicated right for the
narrow agricultural purpose for which the right was quantified.212 Since
there was no treaty provision regarding a fishery flow right, the tribes'
adjudicated amount did not include water for an instream flow.213 As
such, they were precluded from using their adjudicated right for that
purpose.
214
The Wyoming Supreme Court applied the purely federal reserved
rights doctrine utilized in United States v. New Mexico rather than
the Indian reserved rights doctrine: If the tribes wished to use water
for any purpose not enumerated in the treaty creating the reservation,
they had to comply with Wyoming state law.211 If state law did not
recognize the proposed use, then the tribes like any private citizen
would be denied a permit for that proposed use. 2 6 Since Wyoming
did not recognize private appropriation for instream flows, any tribal
request to use the water for that purpose was denied.217 As such, the
court held that the engineer's refusal to comply with the tribes' water
call was legitimate and there was no need to replace him.
218
Protests to the contrary notwithstanding, Big Horn II was not based
on valid state property law grounds. 219 Rather, the fragmented decision
infringed on the tribes' sovereign proprietary authority to regulate the
uses of their adjudicated water by permitting the engineer to apply
state law instead of tribal law when deciding whether a water call was
valid. 20 In this author's opinion, the case will be appealed, providing
the Supreme Court an opportunity to distinguish between Indian and
20. Id.
210. Id.
211:. Id. at *4, *9.
212. Id. at *4. Such purpose was "purely agricultural." Big Horn , 753 P.2d at
95.




217. Id. at *6.
218. Id. at *9.
219. Id. at *4.
220,. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text. The Big Horn 11 decision
contained five separate opinions. See Big Horn II, 1992 WL 119212 at *1 (Macy, J.);
id. at *10 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at "12 (Cardine, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at *16 (Brown, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at '19 (Golden, J., dissenting).
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federal reserved water rights. It should most likely determine whether
the state's "backdoor" method of applying state water regulations
through the engineer's mere authority to count water violates 25 U.S.C.
§ 1322(b). There, Congress stated that no state shall impose any
regulations pertaining to tribal water rights that are "inconsistent with
any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute, or with any regulation made
pursuant thereto; or ... confer jurisdiction upon the State to adju-
dicate ... the ownership or right to possession of such property or
any interest therein."2' Not only does the state law violate the tribes'
interim water code enacted pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934,m it also violates the very principles underlying the Indian
reserved right doctrine as construed in Walton, decided after New
Mexico and denied certiorari by the Supreme Court.223 There, the
Walton court applied federal law and specifically permitted the tribes
to use their Winters right for an instream flow even though the right
was quantified under a strict agricultural purpose standard and did
not include an amount for instream flows.2'
The extent of an Indian reserved right is not a species of state or
tribal regulatory law, but a federal question that is resolved in a state
court. Enforcement of a water adjudication is not the regulation of a
use, but the protection of a right. The tribal court may not have
jurisdiction to hear a purely regulatory complaint against a non-Indian
using excess water." A complaint brought in tribal court by an
individual member or by a tribal private entity to protect a reserved
right may properly avoid categorization as a regulatory complaint, and
be jurisdictionally sound under Indian common or statutory law. 6 To
entertain such a suit a tribe must review its own laws to ensure that
it has enacted the requisite personal and subject-matter components
necessary to secure jurisdiction. "7 The tribal court may expect a review
of its jurisdictional findings in federal court.m In sum, a tribe that
221. 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1988).
222. Id.
223. 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
224. Confederated Colville Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48-49 (1981).
225. See Holly v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 655 F.
Supp. 577 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (Holly II). Compare Brendale v. Confederated Tribes &
Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 428-30 (1989) (White, J., plurality
opinion) (the tribe has no regulatory authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within the reservation) with id. at 438-44 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (balance
of physical and demographic factors may preclude tribal regulatory jurisdiction over
non-Indians on fee land).
226. See National Farmers Union'Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985) (the
tribal court has authority to determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear a civil complaint
arising on fee land within the reservation).
227. See generally Pommersheim, supra note 113.
228. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
554 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
has undergone a quantification of its water right should not be denied
jurisdiction to enforce that right.
The above discussion applies where a tribe has quantified its water
rights through adjudication. Below is a discussion of how settlements
address the jurisdictional issues.
B. Regulatory Jurisdiction Where the Right Has Been Negotiated
The McCarran Amendment's failure to provide the states with a
forum for limiting the extent of Winters claims is perhaps mitigated
by the states' ability to resolve the competing jurisdictional claims
accompanying a river-system adjudication 29 Where tribes and the
states agree to settle Winters claims they are able to determine each
other's jurisdictional limits through negotiation rather than face the
uncertainties that accompany a judicial determination of each entity's
jurisdictional interests. 23 As such, each party is able to cede issues
that it considers to be of lesser importance in order to reach a
satisfactory agreement over other issues each party rates a higher
priority. Jurisdictional issues are subject to such negotiation.23 Fol-
lowing is a discussion of the negotiated outcomes of the jurisdictional
issues in the Fort Peck and Colorado-Ute agreements.
The parties to the Fort Peck compact agreed that all three govern-
ments would play a role in administering the water. First, the compact
provides for federal administration of water rights under the Fort Peck
Irrigation Project;232 second, state administration and regulation of (1)
non-Indian rights and uses within the reservation and (2) uses of
rese:rved water off the reservation;23 third, tribal administration and
regulation of tribal members and Walton users on the reservation."
4
Disputes between tribal, Indian, and Walton users of reserved water
and users- under state law are arbitrated by a three-member panel.2 1
The panel is composed of a tribal representative, a representative of
the state, and a neutral member selected by the other two.236 Appeals
from the board can be taken to any court of "competent jurisdic-
229. See In re Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 76, 114-15 (Wyo.
1988) (Big Horn 1), aff'd by an equally divided Supreme Court per curiam, 490 U.S.
406, reh g denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989). See supra notes 187-224 and accompanying text
(discussing the jurisdictional issues accompanying Big Horn I and Big Horn I1).
230. Big Horn 1, 753 P.2d at 114-15.
231. See SLY, supra note 56, at 74 ("In the Fort Peck settlement, the Tribal Council
was particularly interested in regulatory powers.").
232. Id. at 154.
233. Id. at 154-55.
234. Id. The state is specifically precluded from issuing water permits to Walton
users. Id. at 155.
235. Id.
236. Rundle, supra note 111, at 14-15.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/4
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tion. ' 237 However, the tribal court is "competent" only if all parties
agree . 8
Under the Colorado-Ute agreement, the tribe regulates only tribal
reserved rights. 9 Secretary of the Interior administers the rights of
Walton users, and the state enforces the rights of all non-Indian users
on fee land.2 ° The state's water court system has jurisdiction to resolve
disputes between tribal, Walton, and non-Indian users.2 1 The tribe
has jurisdiction over disputes where only tribal members or users of
reserved water under contract with the tribe are involved.
242
The agreements reveal that the parties can successfully negotiate
issues relating to the enforcement of rights. However, the pacts do
not address the issue of which government has the authority to enforce
water quality complaints or conflicts arising from competing priori-
ties.u3
C. Regulatory Jurisdiction Without Quantification
Quantification of the tribe's reserved right is not necessary in order
to enact and enforce a water code. Without quantification, however,
the basis of jurisdiction is purely territorial.2" It must be noted that
within a reservation which opened to settlement by way of the Dawes
Act, uA statewide water regulations may apply to non-tribal member
users on fee lands.246
However, state-based water codes do not apply to tribal members
on trust lands.247 A tribal water code is enforceable against members
237. SLY, supra note 56, at 155.
238. Rundle, supra note 111, at 14-15.
239. SLY, supra note 56, at 155.
240. Id. at 155-56.
241. Id. Federal court is a potential forum for issues not normally resolved in the
state's water court. Id.
242. Id. at 156.
243. The Fort Peck agreement specified that the state must consider all tribal uses
to be beneficial unless the use is wasteful. See Rundle, supra note 111, at 12. Whether
pollution of water constitutes waste, and whether the state has jurisdiction to prevent
a waste of water, were not determined by the agreement. The Colorado-Ute parties
raised the issue that tribal application of its water to alkaline soils may cause the return
flow to carry excessive amounts of sodium. However, this author is uncertain as to
whether jurisdiction over the water quality of return flows was addressed by the parties.
244. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989). See generally
Clayton, supra note 3.
245. 25 U.S.C. §§ 351-358 (1988).
246. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
247. COHEN, supra note 6, at 349; SLY, supra note 56, at 165 (absent the express
congressional grant of jurisdiction, state water laws are not enforceable on tribal land)
(citing 25 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (1988)).
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on trust land and allotment land held in trust, and Walton users, but
perhaps not against non-tribal member users on fee lands. As such,
the tribe's ability to protect its reserved right against encroaching non-
tribal member users is not a settled matter.
Without quantification, the tribe must exercise its ability to regulate
the uses within the reservation in order to protect one user's right
against another's use.m In order to properly protect each user's right
to use water without infringement by other users, the tribe must enact
both an effective water code and appropriate civil laws. Following is
a discussion of the tribe's options where its Winters right has not been
quantified. First, the section discusses the precedents limiting tribal
regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee lands. Second, the
section relates the experiences of the Colville and Umatilla Reserva-
tions, whose water departments enforce their water codes against
nonmembers on fee lands along with the factors that provided for
such jurisdiction. Finally, the section explores the alternatives facing
the Sioux and other reservations when pursuing jurisdiction to enforce
their own water codes.
1. Precedents Regarding Regulatory Jurisdiction
In Montana v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court reversed the
previous presumption that tribal sovereignty and the policy of self-
government authorized regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indian conduct
on fee lands.250 In preventing tribal jurisdiction over hunting and
fishing on fee lands within the reservation, the Court limited tribal
regulatory jurisdiction to two situations: (1) where the non-Indian
enters into a consensual relationship with the tribe, 1 and (2) where
non.-Indian conduct on fee lands "threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of
the tribe. '-
252
The second Montana exception to the presumption against tribal
regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers was broad enough to encom-
pass every major issue, and permit tribal jurisdiction, regardless of the
presumption. 3 However, the reliability of Montana's second exception
248. A user's right includes the right to use a certain quality as well as quantity of
water.
249. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
250. Brendale, 492 U.S. at 455-56 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Pommersheim, supra
note 113, at 345.
251. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
252. Id. at 566.
253. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (1981) (due to the
hydrologically enclosed nature of the basin within the reservation, tribal self-government
would be sufficiently threatened without jurisdiction over the "excess" water within it);
see alro Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d
529 (th Cir. 1987), rev'd sub nom. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 409 (1989).
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has been cast in doubt by a subsequent Supreme Court opinion,
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation. 4
Brendale has undermined the tribe's legislative authority over the
conduct of nonmembers on fee lands within the reservation even where
the conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, health, or welfare of the tribe. Justice White's
plurality opinion held that tribal regulatory jurisdiction over nonmem-
bers on fee lands within the reservation is prohibited per se.25
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Brendale reached a different
conclusion. His opinion held that the courts should examine the facts
and circumstances as they exist at the time of the litigation in order
to determine which governmental entity has jurisdiction. 6 If the area
of the dispute contains a primarily non-Indian population, with sig-
nificant fee ownership and prevailing state services, the state should
be awarded jurisdiction. 5 7 Conversely, if the area is primarily popu-
lated by Indians, state services are minimal, and fee parcels are scarce,
the court should find that the tribe is the proper regulatory authority.25
While tribal legislative/regulatory jurisdiction is not prohibited per
se, the Supreme Court has placed a premium on existing, successful,
evenhanded enforcement of tribal laws. The message to the tribes is
to pursue effective administration of tribal codes before changing
demographics and physical conditions indicate that nonmember con-
duct is too prevalent and ingrained to deny state regulatory jurisdiction.
It is important for the tribes to enact and demonstrably enforce an
effective water code. Successful enforcement of the water code is a
valuable ingredient, and perhaps an essential element, of the code's
legitimacy should there be litigation over its validity as it applies to
non-tribal members. 9
On many reservations, the distinction between "open" and "closed"
areas is not as clear as the Supreme Court found on the Yakima
Reservation in Brendale. As such, a Brendale-type analysis may not
resolve the jurisdictional issue. Further, a tribe should enact its water
code with the belief that it can be fairly enforced against members
and nonmembers alike.
26°
254. 492 U.S. 408, 428-32 (1989).
255. Id. at 428-31. Instead, the tribe retained a "protected interest," which it could
assert in federal district court after seeking relief under the proper state authority when
non-Indian conduct imperiled a tribal interest. Id. at 431.
256. Id. at 441-48.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 437-44.
259. Id. at 445-66. See infra note 293 for a discussion of the Secretary of the
Interior's moratorium on approving tribal codes and the subsequent "catch-22" position
that the tribes are put in due to the Brendale decision.
260. See generally Pommersheim, supra note 113; Brendale, 492 U.S. at 443 (Stevens,
No. 21
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2. Territorial Jurisdiction Regardless of
Montana and Brendale Decisions
Outside of the courtroom, tribal territorial jurisdiction over water
uses on the reservation may depend on the state's attitude, level of
active management, and budgetary constraints.26' It may also depend
on whether the number of nonmembers, and the amount of acreage
they own, is substantial enough to persuade the state to regulate their
uses . 2 Finally, hydrological circumstances may determine whether the
state has a sufficient interest to pursue the regulation of nonmembers
on fee lands.2 3 Following is a discussion of the reasons why the Colville
and Umatilla tribes regulate the uses of non-Indians on fee lands
within their reservations.
(a) The Colville Experience
Today, the Colville Reservation Water Code264 is enforceable against
non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation.215 Both Indian and
non-Indian users, including users on fee lands, must obtain their
penits with the tribe.m Tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians has evolved
since the enactment of a water code in 1974. The state's own limita-
tiorns, and the tribes' ability to enforce their code, has combined to
confer regulatory jurisdiction on the tribes.
J., plurality opinion) (tribal regulations prohibiting hunting and fishing on nonmember
fee lands while allowing such activities on tribal lands in Montana was a factor In
denying tribal regulatory jurisdiction).
261. See infra notes 264-71 and accompanying text (discussing the Colville experi-
ence).
252. See infra notes 272-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Umatilla experi-
ence).
253. See Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (1981).
2514. COLVILLE RESERVATION WATER CODE § II(C) (1974).
255. Telephone Interview with Gary Pasmore, Director, Water Resources Depart-
ment, Colville Indian Reservation (July 2, 1991) [hereinafter Pasmore Interview, July
2].
266. The Colville Water Code is administered through a permit system. COLVILLE
RESERVATiON WATER CODE § II(C) (1974). Its permit is tantamount to a permanent
license to use water. Telephone Interview with Gary Pasmore, Director, Water Resources
Department, Colville Indian Reservation (Aug. 8, 1991) [hereinafter Pasmore Interview,
Aug. 81. Users are awarded permits so long as there is available water and the potential
for conflict with existing uses is minimal. Id. Although most permits are for domestic-
use wells, some larger permits have been granted to non-Indians for irrigation projects.
Id. In fact, more permits for more amounts of water are issued to non-Indians than
Indians. Id.
The permits are computerized and cross-filed. Some of the methods include filing by
name, location, type of use, type of diversion method, and amount diverted. The code
allocates water during times of shortage according to the type of use. Id. However, the
director is considering adopting a "first in time, first in right" system among similarly
situated users of tribal water in order to avoid a waste of water. Id.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/4
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The Colville Reservation's water director stated that in the past, the
state of Washington most likely issued permits beyond the amount of
water available for appropriation under state law within the reserva-
tion.267 Because of this, overappropriation of some of the water systems
exists.2 8
Water problems in other parts of the state have commanded the
state's budget and personnel. 269 The existence of a viable water ad-
ministration system on the Colville Reservation has relieved the state
of the need to expend resources in that area. 270 The attorney general
in that state indicated to the Colville tribes' water resources director
that his office was not interested in supporting a challenge against
tribal jurisdiction. 271 As such, Washington's budgetary constraints plus
the existence of a viable tribal water code caused the state to acquiesce
to, if not endorse, tribal regulatory authority over non-Indian water
users on the reservation.
(b) The Umatilla Experience
The Umatilla Indian Reservation, located within the borders of the
state of Oregon, also exerts territorial jurisdiction over waters within
the reservation. The tribe's ability to exercise jurisdiction over non-
Indians on fee land without a jurisdictional dispute is due to the tribe's
historical cooperation with the county, fair administration of their
zoning code throughout the reservation, and proof that their water
code was not only superior to the state's code but it could be enforced
by the tribe better than the state could enforce its own code. 272
In 1981, the Umatilla tribe took a hard look at its water situation. 273
It discovered that off-reservation users were pumping groundwater at
267. Id.
268. There is very little surface water within the reservation but sufficient quantities
of groundwater. Id. The Columbia River serves as the reservation's eastern border and
part of its southern border. Although the reservation contains over 1 million acres, one
source has estimated that only 15,000 acres are practicably irrigable. See U.S. BUREAU
OF INDIAN AFFAiRS, INDIAN IRRIGATION PROJECTS PRESENTLY INCLUDED IN THE BIA
IRRIOATION CONSTRUCTION PRooRm (1975), reprinted in INDIAN WATER RIOHTS IN THE
VEST 86, 89 (Western States Water Council ed., 1984).
269. Pasmore Interview, Aug. 8, supra note 266.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Telephone Interview with Mike Farrow, Director, Department of Land and
Natural Resources, Umatilla Indian Reservation (Aug. 5, 1991) [hereinafter Farrow
Interview, Aug. 5].
273. Address by Douglas Nash, Symposium on Indian Water Policy (Nov. 9, 1981),
in INDIAN WATER POLICY IN A CHANI ENVIRONMENT 81, 82 (Am. Indian L. Training
Program 1982) [hereinafter Nash address]. Demographically, the Umatilla Reservation
is comprised of half fee land and half tribal land. Farrow Interview, Aug 5, supra note
272. The respective populations are also evenly divided: there are 1700 Indians and 1600
non-Indians within the borders of the reservation. Id. Two thousand acres are currently
being irrigated by non-Indians; tribal members irrigate 200 acres. Id.
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a rate faster than it was recharging, which was affecting on-reservation
wells. 274 Further, the state's inadequate regulation of well drilling
resulted in the construction of wells that leaked and created pollution
among the different aquifers.2 75 Moreover, the state did not have the
resources, water management capability, or desire to stop the ground-
water mining that was taking place.
2 7 6
The tribe determined that its best interests lay in preserving the
quantity and quality of water on the reservation themselves; they could
not rely on the federal government or state to do it for them. 27 7 To
achieve this purpose they decided to enact and enforce a water code.278
The director of the Umatilla Reservation Department of Land and
ResDurces stated that the tribes' ability to enforce their water code
since 1981 can be traced to their historical track record of fairly,
enforcing a comprehensive zoning code over members and nonmembers
since 1974.279 When non-tribal members saw that the zoning department
was not afraid to enforce its code evenhandedly, credibility in the
program was instilled and compliance followed.28 0 There is no argument
over whether the water belongs to the tribes or the state. 28,
Through communication, the tribes convinced the state that its code
was more complete and that they could manage the water within the




278. Id. The tribes basically reshaped the state's water code to reflect their own
interests. They replaced the state's consumption-oriented policies with policies that
emphasized conservation, tightened up the state's well drilling standards, and eliminated
the first-in-time priority system with a "balancing the uses" method. Id. The tribes
enforce the code through a permit system. UMATILLA INTERM WATER CODE § V (1981).
The permits do not confer a permanent license to the user. Id. § V(6)(H)(l). Rather,
the permit is renewable every five years. Id.
In 1986, the tribes drafted a new water code that integrates four essential aspects of
a successful, comprehensive plan. Telephone Interview with Mike Farrow, Director,
Department of Land and Resources, and Aaron Skervin, Water Manager, Umatilla
Indian Reservation (Aug. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Farrow & Skervin Interview]. First, it
contains an allocation scheme where eighteen beneficial uses are listed. They emphasize
conservation and water quality over consumption. Second, the drafted code authorizes
the tribes to embark on a quantification of their water rights through negotiation with
the state. Third, it specifies how the tribes' municipal water system should operate.
Finally, it creates eight water management zones and dictates how water is to be used
for dwveloping the different zones, in conjunction with the tribes' comprehensive land
zoning ordinance. Implementing the new code is currently on hold because of a lack of
funds. Farrow Interview, Aug. 5, supra note 272.
279. Farrow Interview, Aug. 5, supra note 272.





reservation better than the state. 2 2 Moreover, tribal administration
eliminated the state's need to expend its own resources to essentially
duplicate the tribes' efforts.383 As a result, the state has not interfered
with the tribes' jurisdiction over non-Indians. In essence, the state's
acceptance of tribal jurisdiction could be reduced to two reasons: good
business and trust, based on historical experience.
In sum, tribal territorial jurisdiction to regulate the water use of
nonmembers depends on the state's agreement or acquiescence. Such
acceptance may accrue from the state's interest in saving the resources
necessary to administer its water law within the reservation, and its
belief that the tribe will administer the code in a fair, evenhanded
manner. Where the tribe has no record of regulatory enforcement to
be judged by, or where the state has no budgetary concerns or water
management problems that consume its resources elsewhere, the tribe's
ability to exercise territorial jurisdiction over the water within its state
will depend on other factors. Those factors include the demographics
of the reservation, tribal-state relationships, and common issues relat-
ing to money and power.
II. Policy Issues Tribes Face When Enacting a Water Code
The above sections identify issues that tribes may encounter when
deciding whether to quantify their Winters rights or enforce their water
codes throughout their reservations. The section below discusses issues
that tribes may encounter in deciding whether to enact their water
codes.
A. Impediments to Enacting a Water Code
Tribal governments organized under the IRA2" invariably operate
under "boilerplate" constitutions, written by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) and patterned after the United States Constitution.u5
The original constitutions contain a provision that the laws enacted
by the tribal council require approval by the Secretary of the Interior
before they become effective.
6
282. Id. While the tribes were attempting to assert regulatory jurisdiction over the
reservation, the state was receiving widespread criticism concerning its ability to preserve
its own water resources. Id.
283. Id.
284. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988).
285. COHEN, supra note 6, at 149.
286. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988); cf. ROSEBUD Sioux TRIBE CONST. art. 4, § 2 (repealed
1985) ("Any resolution or ordinance which, by the terms of this Constitution, is subject
to review by the Secretary of the Interior, shall be presented to the Superintendent of
the Reservation, who shall, within ten (10) days hereafter, approve or disapprove the
same.").
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In the mid-1970s, the western states pressured the Department of
the Interior to refuse approval of tribal water codes. 287 In response,
the Secretary placed a moratorium on the approval of all water codes
pending the adoption of regulations providing guidelines for ap-
proval.us
Regulations were proposed in 1977 and revised in 1981, but never
adopted. 289 Whether the moratorium has been lifted or not is a matter
of debate. However, tribes organized under the IRA continue to
operate with uncertainty29° and suspicion that the withholding of ap-
proval is politically guided.
The Water Resources Director of the BIA stated that tribal water
codes are approved on an "ad hoc" basis. 291 However, the criteria for
approval arise from the very forces that caused the moratorium in the
first place. In order to obtain approval, there must be a showing that
the water code will not cause strained relations between the state and
the tribe.292 Under this "political purity" standard, the tribe invariably
must send its water code to the state attorney general's office. The
office then responds with any objections that it may have. The Sec-
retaiy then reviews the objections to determine whether they are sub-
stantial enough to cause political turbulence. If the objections are
substantial, the water code is not approved.
In order to overcome nonapproval, the tribe must make presentations
to the BIA superintendent on the reservation, the regional superinten-
dent, and others in the BIA hierarchy leading to the Secretary of the
Interior. The presentations must convince the BIA authorities that the
water code should be approved regardless of a state's objections.
23
287. Getches, From Conflict to Pragmatism, supra note 117, at 527.
2E8. Id. (citing Memorandum from Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior,
to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (Jan. 15, 1975)).
289. Id. at 527-28.
290. In 1977, the Rosebud Tribal Council enacted a comprehensive water code.
Resolution No. 77-32, Rosebud Sioux Tribe (1977). The superintendent did not approve
or disapprove the code, but "noted and transmitted" it. Memorandum from Wallace
G. Dunker, BIA Field Solicitor, to the BIA Area Director (July 18, 1977). Absent
approval, the tribe has not attempted to enforce its code, even though it has the
technological expertise and personnel to do so and has subsequently removed the
provision from its constitution requiring the Secretary's approval of such laws. See
Telephone Interview with Syed Huq, Director, Office of Water Resources, Rosebud
Sioux Reservation (Aug. 5, 1991). See supra note 286.
291. Telephone Interview with Fain Gildea, Director, Water Resources, BIA (June
21, 1991) [hereinafter Gildea Interview].
292. Id. Ms. Gildea referred to this procedure as requiring "political purity" between
the tribe and the state. Id.
293. Id. This procedure is referred to as a "strategy to influence" the Department
of the Interior. Id. Besides providing the states with virtual veto power over the tribe's
water code, the procedure conflicts with Stevens' plurality opinion in Brendale: if the
state can obstruct the tribe's ability to regulate the development of resources within the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/4
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The Fort Peck Water Code was approved by the Secretary; its code
was enacted pursuant to the water compact between the Fort Peck
Reservation and the state of Montana. As such, it easily passed the
"political purity" standard. To date, it is the only water code approved
under this "ad hoc" method.
Further, the tribe may amend its constitution to remove the obstacles
to enacting a valid water code. 294 By repealing the provision requiring
the Secretary's approval of ordinances, the moratorium on approval
is no longer applicable. 211 Absent a tribal constitutional amendment,
the tribe may also consider enacting a code enforceable against tribal
members only. Such a code will meet the "political purity" standard
for approval. More importantly, it will enable the tribe to organize its
agencies and regulate the use of water for the benefit of the tribe.
B. Why Enact a Water Code
Water codes reflect a society's outlook as to the purposes that water
should serve in its members' lives and culture. If water embodies a
tribe's notion of community, then the code should be enacted to
preserve water for the use and benefit of all residing within that tribal
community. 29 A tribe may enact a water code to ensure that it has
the means to protect water for the maintenance of its reservation as
a permanent homeland. 297 Wishing to preserve the quantity and quality
of the waters within a reservation, 298 a code may enable a tribe to
regulate water for the development of economic resources. 299 Legal
reservation, the tribe cannot maintain the essential character of the reservation. See
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
440 (1989). As such, the tribe cannot prevent the change that causes it to lose jurisdic-
tional authority. Id. This situation highlights the "catch-22" position that the tribes are
put in: federal authority over the tribes prevents them from asserting the very jurisdiction
over the reservation that is essential for them to maintain sovereign jurisdiction.
294. Gildea Interview, supra note 291. In 1985, the Rosebud Sioux Tribe passed
such an amendment. ROSEBUD Sioux TRIE CONST. amend. XVIII. Tribal ordinances
no longer require the Secretary's approval. Thus, there are no longer any external
barriers to the tribe's enactment of a water code.
295. The tribe is also able to withstand legal challenges to its water code on the
basis that it is unconstitutional.
296. NAVAJO Tam. CODE tit. 22, § 1101 (Supp. 1984-85); ROSEBUD SIOUX WATER
CODE § 1.1 (1977); UMATYLA INTERIM WATER CODE § 1 (1981).
297. Treaty with the Sioux Indians, (Fort Laramie Treaty), Apr. 29, 1868, art. 15,
15 Stat. 635, 640; RosEaUD SIOUX WATER CODE § 1.1 (1977); NAVAJO TRm. CODE tit.
22, § 1101 (Supp. 1984-85). Signatories to the Fort Laramie Treaty included the Brule,
Oglala, Miniconjou, Yankton, Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs,
Santee, and Arapaho tribes.
298. ROSEBUD Sioux TRmAL CONST. preamble. See supra notes 273-78 and accom-
panying text (discussing the purposes for enacting the Umatilla Interim Water Code).
299. ROSEBUD Sioux TRIAL CONST. preamble; ROSEBUD SIoux WATER CODE § 1.1
(1977); NAVAJO TmB. CODE tit. 22, § 1101 (Supp. 1984-85); UMATnxA INTERIM WATER
CODE § I(L)(2) (1981).
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control of a tribal resource may aid the tribe in the just, equitable,
and orderly distribution of water, 3°° and also represent an assertion of
sovereignty.301 Finally, tribal regulation of water serves the general
health and welfare interests of a tribe as a whole.
3( 2
A tribe may wish to incorporate language from relevant case law to
support its claim for regulatory authority. For instance, it may enact
a coherent water code to protect or promote the "political integrity,
economic security, and health and welfare" of the tribe303 or to "pre-
serve the essential character" of the reservation. 30 The stated purposes
for enacting a water code should accurately reflect the tribe's reasons
for enacting it.30 s Public meetings to discuss enactment of the code
will help define the tribe's purposes, and will instill popular support
for ihe code.3°6
C. Taking Inventory of the Water, Budget,
Office Space and Personnel
1. Water Inventory
In order to effectively administer a water code, a tribe must know
how much water exists on and under the reservation, and where it is
located.3°0 It is suggested that a tribe take inventory of its water in
300. NAvAJo TRm. CODE tit. 22, § 1101 (Supp. 1984-85) (just and equitable);
U MTvuA INTERIM WATER CODE § II(A) (1981) (orderly).
301. NAvAjo TRn. CODE tit. 22, § 1101 (Supp. 1984-85); RosEaUD Sioux VATER
CODE § 1.1 (1977); UmATrLLA INTERIM WATER CODE § I(J) (1981).
302. ROsEBuD Sioux TRIAL CONST. preamble; ROSEBUD SIOUX VATER CODE § 1.1
(1977); UMATIL.A INTERIM WATER CODE § I(B) (1981) (benefits the reservation as a
whole).
303. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
304. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 439 (1989).
30:5. At least two tribes have asserted territorial jurisdiction as a stated purpose for
enacting a water code. See NAVAJO Tgar. CODE tit. 22, § 1101 (Supp. 1984-85); Holly
v. Tolus, 655 F. Supp. 548, 551 (E.D. Wash. 1983) (Holly 1). The assertion, by itself,
was not sufficient to provide tribal territorial jurisdiction over all waters within the
reservation. See Holly v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 655
F. Supp. 557, 559 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (Holly I1). The Umatilla Reservation states that
the water code applies to the whole reservation. UMATULA INTERIM WATER CODE § III
(1981).
306. Orville St. Claire & Wes Martel, Wind River Associates, Address to the Mni
Sose Tribal Water Rights Coalition, in Rapid City, S.D. (July 9, 1991). The Shoshone
and Arapahoe tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation conducted twelve open
meetings in three weeks at various locations within the reservation to exchange infor-
mation concerning the enactment of their water code. A specific topic was discussed at
each meeting. The topics included (I) the hydrologic cycle of water within the reservation,
(2) jurisdictional issues, and (3) the code itself, including the policies supporting its
enactment. The meetings were never closed, and included non-Indians.
307. A search should also be conducted to discover water sources on trust and
allotment lands located on diminished portions of a reservation, if applicable.
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two steps. 0 First, a member or committee may uncover all existing
information dealing with the whereabouts of water within the reser-
vation.3°9 Such information could be found in sources such as a state's
water department, the United States Geological Survey, 310 the National
Weather Bureau, state colleges and universities, and municipal water
deliverers.
3"
Next, the tribe can verify its initial findings by hiring a professional
hydrogeologist or firm.112 The tribe should be prepared to pay for the
drilling of test wells and building of precipitation gauging and stream
gauging stations.3 3 From these tests, the tribe will learn where the
water comes from, where it goes, and what happens to it in between.314
2. Office and Staff Inventory
To effectively manage its water resource, tribes have formed water
departments. Such departments monitor water users within the reser-
vation along with the quantity and quality of surface and groundwater.
Before enacting a water code, a tribe should weigh its need for one
against the cost of effective enforcement. Existence of a tribal water
code may not be worthwhile for reservations in the following situations:
(1) where water is not being extensively used by members or nonmem-
bers, (2) the tribe does not foresee development of its water resource
in the near future by members or non-tribal members, and (3) the
tribe's sovereignty will not be eroded if it does not enact and enforce
a water code. 315
D. Tribal Beneficial Uses of Water
Once a tribe determines that its goals weigh heavily in favor of
enacting a water code, it may designate water uses that further those
goals. "Beneficial uses" of water are those uses which promote the
policies identified in a code.316 Tribal codes generally list the uses in
308. Douglas Nash, Tribal Water Code Development, RoCKY MTN. MrN. L. INST.
117, 118-19 (1985) [hereinafter Nash, Code Development].
309. Id.
310. The United States Geological Survey may provide matching funds to survey
and approximate the amount of water within a reservation. Pasmore Interview, July 2,
supra note 265.
311. Nash, Code Development, supra note 308, at 118.
312. Id. at 119.
313. Id.
314. Id. Nash also recommends that the tribe estimates its future water needs. This
entails a prediction or estimate of the tribe's future water uses. Id.
315. See Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation,
492 U.S. 408, 444-49 (1989) (without the enactment and enforcement of regulatory
codes, tribes risk losing their ability to determine the essential character of their
reservation).
316. Id. at 464.
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the order of their preference, and define priority of right by priority
of use.317 The greatest difference between the beneficial uses identified
by states as opposed to those identified by tribes is that state uses
emphasize consumptive uses and ignore conservation-type uses.3"' Gen-
erally, use lists are not exclusive; this gives a tribe flexibility in rec-
ognizing future beneficial uses. A code may emphasize or prohibit uses
that (1) waste water, (2) are not in the interest of a tribe, or (3) are
contrary to the health or welfare of a tribe.3 9
E. Determining Priorities Among Competing Users
While the priority-based list of beneficial uses resolves disputes
between different types of users, it does not address disputes that arise
between users for the same purposes. Tribes must choose their method
of allocating this scarce resource. The choices range from (I) "first in
time, first in right," (2) "reasonable use," and (3) "balancing the
USes;. "
1. First in Time, First in Right
The "first in time, first in right" method of adjudicating disputes
is the heart of the law in water-scarce western states. 320 Under this
philosophy of allocation, the use of water by the first person may
harm another (the second person), who does not receive enough to
satisfy her/his needs. By its terms, the second user's harm is both
expected and sanctioned if the second user began using water at a
later date than the first user. The risk inheres to the second user, who
317. See e.g., NAVAJO TRm. CODE tit. 22, § 1501(4) (Supp. 1984-85); ROSEBUD SIOUX
WVATI'R CODE § 5.1(4) 0977); UIArILLA INTERIM WATER CODE § I (1981). The list of
beneficial uses, in their order of preference, include domestic uses, community or
municipal uses, stock watering, agriculture, fish and wildlife, recreation, aesthetics,
industry, mining, power, flood control, fire protection, water quality, and any other
uses that promote the policies of the code.
Priorities according to use are enforced during periods of scarcity. During shortages,
the more beneficial uses will continue to receive water at the expense of less beneficial
uses. The less beneficial uses may simply be cut off. As such, it is important for the
list to accurately reflect the tribe's preferences. Priorities relating to water quality may
be enforced any time there is a violation.
318. Farrow Interview, Aug. 5, supra note 272.
319. NAVAJO Tarm. CODE tit. 22, § 2301 (Supp. 1984-85); UMATIL.A INTERIM WATER
CODE § I(L)(5) (1981).
320. See Coffin v. Left Harld Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882). Almost every water
law regime employs a priority system based on priority of time. See generally Frank J.
Trelease, New Water Legislation: Drafting for Development, Efficient Allocation and
Environmental Protection, 12 LAND & WATER L. Rsv. 385 (1977); Telephone Interview
with Mike Farrow, Director, Department of Land and Resources, Umatilla Reservation
(Aug. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Farrow Interview, Aug.. 6] (rights of existing users are
considered prior to approving new permits).
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invests accordingly. The emphasis is on efficiency and growth, not
harmony among users.
3 2'
This method of allocation is relatively easy to enforce since all
disputes are governed by a determination of who used the water first.
Enforcement entails the singular act of turning off a headgate or
capping a well, with periodic reviews to ensure that the water remains
turned off.
Determining priorities based on the date of appropriation is perhaps
arbitrary, since social policy issues are eliminated from consideration.
While a priority system based on the type of use mitigates the harshness
of this method, a priority based on the date of appropriation may
provide non-tribal members with an unshakable hold on the water.
The latter method could be detrimental to a tribe's policy of promoting
the interests of its people, when the tribe wishes to use the water in
the same manner as non-tribal members. However, the method avoids
charges of discrimination that can result from a subjective balancing
test, especially where non-tribal members are involved. Quantification
will resolve these conflicts.
2. Proportional Sharing
A system of proportional sharing promotes harmony over efficiency
and growth. It embraces the policy that all users are treated equally.
Where water is scarce, however, harmony may be impossible to achieve
and can result in waste.3z2 Moreover, it is an inefficient system to
manage. The regulating agency must oversee ratable cutbacks among
all of the users on a continuing basis instead of performing the singular
act of shutting off one or several headgates or wells.
3. Balancing the Uses
When the enforcing body is required to take an action that may
harm an existing user, including the resolution of a complaint against
a user, it may employ a "balancing the uses" test. 3' A water committee
balances the user's hardship against the best interests of the tribe and
its members, and considers any less harmful alternatives to the pro-
posed action. 24
321. Underscoring this rule is society's policy of ensuring that some survive during
times of scarcity rather than permitting all to fail under a ratable apportionment of the
water.
322. For instance, a ratable cutback among agricultural users may cause every user
to suffer a crop failure, whereas a priority-based system may ensure that some crops
are harvested.
323. See e.g., ROSEBUD SIoUx WATER CODE § 5.1(2) (1977); NAvAJo Tasa. CODE tit.
22, § 1501(2) (Supp. 1984-85); UMATILA ItRIM' WATER CODE § V(D)(6) (1981).
324. RosEBuD SIOUX WATER CODE § 5.1(2) (1977); NAVAjO TmB. CODE tit. 22, §
1501(2) (Supp. 1984-85); UMATILLA INTERIM WATER CODE § V(D)(6) (1981).
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Although this system is time consuming and complicated, its impli-
cation could better promote harmony among tribal users. 32 This har-
monious goal may be difficult to achieve, where competing uses and
scarcity cause displacement among entrenched historical users.
3 26
The Umatilla tribe applies a "balancing the uses" method of allo-
cation that adopts a de facto "first in time" priority system. 27 Any
well must be test-pumped before it is approved. If it causes harm to
existing users, its use is restricted to accommodate prior users. If the
restrictions cannot prevent the harm that the well causes, a permit is
not granted. The tribe relies on its water monitoring technology to
ensure that a water system or basin will not become overappropriated.
The Navajo and Sioux water codes are able to employ each method,
depending on the circumstances.3 28 Both tribes have a water committee
325. The Navajo Nation is contemplating adoption of the "first in time" priority
system for its sheer simplicity. Telephone Interview with Robert Becker, Navajo Water
Resources Management Department (June 26, 1991) [hereinafter Becker Interview].
South Dakota and other western states apply the "first in time" priority system to
resolve water quantity disputes. However, if a user with a higher priority of use but
lower priority of time demanded water ahead of a prior appropriator with a lower-
priority beneficial use, a court would be compelled to award the water to the user with
the higher priority of use. A court may also award the prior appropriator damages. For
example, if a municipality required water from an aquifer to such an extent that it
would displace prior agricultural appropriators, it might be allowed to pump the water
but it would also be required to pay damages to the agricultural appropriators for their
losses. Telephone Interview with Jim Goodman, Water Engineer, Department of Envi-
ronment and Natural Resources, State of South Dakota (June 26, 1991) [hereinafter
Goodman Interview].
326. The "balancing the uses" test was crafted to promote tribal interests. At the
same time, it may cause potentially discriminatory treatment of non-Indians. See infra
notes 371-80 and accompanying text (discussing water code enforcement and equal
protection of nonmembers). Although the test may not violate the tribe's bill of rights
or the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, see infra notes 349-70, it may inhibit the
Secretary of the Interior's approval necessary for the code's applicability to everyone
within the reservation if the tribe's government was revitalized under the Indian Reor-
ganization Act of 1934, or may cause a federal district court to deny that the code is
enforceable against non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation. See Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 546 (1981). The discriminatory nature of this test disappears
where there has been quantification, because the relative priorities of time between
reserved right users and state water users is determined in the adjudication or settlement.
See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
327. UMATr.AL IN RM WATER CODE § VI(D)(6) (1981); Farrow Interview, Aug. 6,
supra note 320.
328. See NAvAJo TRm. CODE tit. 22, §§ 1801-1813 (Supp. 1984-85) (subchapter 8,
"Deternrination of Availability and Need"); ROSEBUD SIOUX WATER CODE §§ 8.1-8.13
(1977) (chapter 8, "Determination of Availability and Need"). The procedure is invoked
when it becomes apparent, either through complaints or investigation by the Water
Admiristrator, that a particular basin is or will be overappropriated. NAvAjo Tam.
CODE tit. 22, § 1801; ROSEBUD SIOUX WATER CODE § 8.1. Then, after a "proceeding"
where everyone who may be affected is given notice and opportunity to participate, the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/4
No. 2] COMMENTS
and administrator. 29 Users may appropriate water from a basin until
overappropriation occurs or a new proposed use causes dislocation of
water among the prior users.330 When either event occurs, all affected
appropriators may have their uses altered. After an investigation by
the water administrator and a formal hearing, the water committee is
authorized to prescribe methods for coping with the overappropriation
or new user's application.
331
One method establishes a priority list among the users in the basin.
3 32
When compiling this list, the code directs the water committee to
balance the uses to determine the order of priority among the users.
333
A committee's method of water reallocation is not limited.
F. Sources of Water
When a tribe identifies its sources of water, it should employ a
system that best regulates water use from the particular source.13 4 For
example, groundwater does not perfectly lend itself to the "first in
time, first in right" method of allocation as well as streams do. Where
Administrator prepares a report for review by the Water Committee. NAvAJo TaRn.
CODE tit. 22, §§ 1803, 1805; ROSEBUD SIOUX WATER CODE §§ 8.3, 8.5. The Water
Committee then proposes a Determination of Availability and Need. NAvAjo TaR. CODE
tit. 22, § 1807; ROSEBD Sioux VATER CODE § 8.7. One of its recommendations may
include "a list of priorities to be observed within the affected area." NAvAJo Tum.
CODE tit. 22, § 1808(4); ROSEBD SIOUX WATER CODE § 8.8(4). A formal hearing is
then conducted in the affected basin, and the respective water committees are then
authorized to adopt a Final Determination of Availability and Need. NAvAJo TRM.
CODE tit. 22, §§ 1809-1811; RosEauD Sioux WATER CODE §§ 8.9-.11. The list of priorities
does not have to adhere to a priority based on the date of appropriation, but can be
based on other reasonable criteria, such as tie balancing of significant factors including
need, efficiency, amount of investment, and best interests of the tribe.
This chapter is essentially an ad hoc mechanism for dealing with overappropriation
and zoning problems. Through proper planning and technical support, overappropriation
can be avoided. A comprehensive zoning scheme will prevent water shortages due to
competing types of uses. Farrow Interview, Aug. 6, supra note 320. Limiting the life
of a permit to five years also gives the tribe time to enact a zoning scheme. Id.
329. Id.
330. NAVAJo TRm. CODE tit. 22, § 1801 (Supp. 1984-85); RosaBUD SIOUX WATER
CODE § 8.1 (1977).
331. NAVAJo TRn. CODE tit. 22, § 1808 (Supp. 1984-85); RosEBUD Sioux WATER
CODE § 8.8 (1977).
332. Apparently, the Water Committee cannot alter the preference among uses
specified in its code. See NAVAJO Tam. CODE tit. 22, § 1501(4) (Supp. 1984-85); ROsEBUD
SIOux WATER CODE § 5.1(4) (1977). It would be left with determining the priorities
among same-type users. See NAvAJo TRm. CODE tit. 22, § 1808(4); ROsEBUD SIOux
WATER CODE § 8.8(4).
333. See NAvAJo TRn. CODE tit. 22, § 1501(2)-(3) (Supp. 1984-85); ROSEBUD Sioux
WATER CODE § 5.1(2)-(3) (1977).
334. See Nash, Code Development, supra note 308, at 118.
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streams rely on predictable seasonal precipitation for their source of
water, groundwater exists as the result of surface seepage or entrapment
by glacial or geological forces."- Some aquifers 36 can be recharged
and some cannot.3 7 Where groundwater cannot be recharged, or too
many users prevent an aquifer from recharging, the federal government
may need to regulate the depletion of the aquifer or enjoin certain
users to promote recharge.
3 38
The right of prior appropriation may not be the issue where ground-
water is being pumped, because there may be plenty of water in the
aquifer. Instead, the dispute between users may revolve around the
rate of removal; one user may pump the water faster than it can be
recharged in the immediate future, harming nearby pumpers .
39
Regulating well drilling is highly technical. Within an industry there
are standard requirements for drilling wells fashioned by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). The Umatilla Interim Water Code
335. CHsRLES J. MEYERS ET AL., WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 584-93 (1988).
336. "Aquifer" and "groundwater" are used interchangeably; they both refer to
subsurface bodies of water contained by relatively porous or permeable material, Id. at
585-88.
337. MEms, supra note 335, at 629.
338. Id. at 614-57. Some states recognize that groundwater is connected to the
hydrological cycle, and acknowledge that some groundwater depends on the hydrological
cycle for its existence. They have modified the "first in right" principle when ground-
water is the source of the appropriation. See, e.g., S.D. CoDIFiED LAws ANN. § 46-6-
3 (1987). As such, groundwater appropriations that cause water to be removed from
aquifers faster than they can annually be recharged are prohibited. Id. § 46-6-3.1. These
laws create a zone of comfort and limitation for existing well users. New permits are
disallowed once the underground source is appropriated to the limit of its ability to
annually recharge. Id. There is an exception for public water distribution systems. See,
e.g., In re South Lincoln Rural Water Sys., 295 N.W.2d 743, 745-46 (S.D. 1980).
339. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
(1) A proprietor of land or his grantee who withdraws ground water
from the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not subject to liability
for interference with the use of water by another unless
(a) the withdrawal of ground water unreasonably causes harm
to a proprietor of neighboring land through lowering the
water table or reducing artesian pressure,
(b) the withdrawal of ground water exceeds the proprietor's
reasonable share of the annual supply or total store of ground
water, or
(c) the withdrawal of the ground water has a direct and
substantial effect upon a watercourse or lake and unreason-
ably causes harm to a person entitled to use the water.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 858 (1977). This particular law, referred to as a
"reasonable use" law, only addresses "quantity" disputes and does not include the
damaging effects created by improperly sealed wells, which cause pollution of connected
aquifers.
See MEYERS, supra note 335, at 580-703 for further discussion concerning the respective
rights of groundwater users.
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and most regulatory agencies require a special well drilling permit,
where only licensed and bonded drillers are permitted to drill the
wells.314 Tribal adoption of technical standards for drilling wells, and
the hiring of personnel who understand the standards and can spot
discrepancies between the drilling method and the standards, allows a
tribe to protect both the water quality of its aquifers and nearby users.
Sources for regulations of well drilling include the EPA and state
laws.
341
G. Procedural Due Process, Equal Protection and the ICRA
All water codes should address the rights and protections provided
by a tribe's bill of rights, 342 if its constitution includes them, or the
1968 Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA). 43 ICRA brings many types of
constitutional rights enjoyed by non-Indians to the reservation.344 In
pertinent part the act states: "No tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall ... (8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or
property without due process of law."' ' "
An equal protection issue may arise where a tribal water agency
denies approval of a non-tribal member's water permit, or where it
enforces violations of the code against non-tribal members but not
tribal members. A due process complaint may arise where a water
code does not provide for sufficient notice and an opportunity to be
heard, before an impartial tribunal, where an individual is denied a
permit or is found to be in violation of a water code.
It is important to note that, as held in Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez,346 tribal judicial authority alone is charged with determining
whether a tribe's government has violated an individual's right(s) under
ICRA. 347 In Martinez, the Supreme Court held that ICRA did not
340. UuATmLA INTanuM WATER CODE § X (1981).
341. Huq Interview, supra note 290; Farrow Interview, Aug. 5, supra note 272. The
Umatilla Interim Water Code requires the completion of a supplemental form describing
the well. UmTn.uA Ii Rmn WATR CODE § X(C)(1) (1981).
342. See, e.g., ROSEBUD Sioux TRIE CoNsT. art. X, § 3 ("No person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor be denied equal
protection of law.").
343. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988).
344. The United States Constitution has never applied to Indian reservations. See
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 986 (1896). However, Congress has "plenary power" over
tribal governments. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). Congress
reasoned that certain constitutional rights enjoyed by its citizens should also be extended
to those on reservations. See generally Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil Rights
Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1 (1979).
345. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988).
346. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
347. Id. at 70-72.
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imply a federal cause of action reviewable by federal courts.3 4 ICRA
does not distinguish between Indians and non-Indians; both claimants'
rights are defined by the tribal court. 39
1. Procedural Due Process
Procedural due process refers to a government agency's practice of
providing (1) notice and (2) an opportunity to be heard for a person
who is or may be affected by the governmental action, (3) before an
imparial hearer or tribunal who has the authority to act in favor of
the individual. A discussion of the water code's relationship to each
of the due process elements follows.
(a) Notice
If a tribe decides to enforce its water code through a permit system,
it should provide for proper procedural due process in two situations.
First, notice should be given to those who may be adversely affected
by a proposed use during the application process or proposed modi-
fication of an existing use.3 0 Prior to granting or denying a permit,
the agency gives notice and an opportunity to be heard to all who
343. The Court made an exception for a writ of habeas corpus where the applicant
was physically detained. Id. at 67.
34!). See R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth., 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985). However, where a non-Indian is denied a
tribal rorum to pursue his claim (and denied a forum de facto, since sovereign immunity
precludes state court jurisdiction over a tribal governmental entity), federal court is
available to provide the claimant a remedy under ICRA. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v.
Arapahoe & Shoshone Tribes, 623 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1118 (1981). Presumably, an Indian claimant could also pursue his remedy in
federal court under ICRA if the claimant were denied a tribal forum. Beyond this
exception, one's ability to obtain federal court review of official tribal action depends
on the categorization of her/his legal theory in terms other than ICRA. Gregory Schultz,
The Federal Due Process and Equal Protection Rights of Non-Indian Civil Litigants in
Tribal Courts After Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 62 DEN,. U. L. Ray. 761 (1985).
350. NAVAyO TaRn. CODE tit. 22, §§ 1607-1608 (Supp. 1984-85); RosEBUD Sioux
WATER CODE § 6.5 (1977). Contents of the notice include a map of the area where the
proposed permit will divert the water, the name and address of the applicant, a
description of the source of water, the quantity of water requested, the exact location
of diversion, the method of diversion, and a description of the use that the water will
be put to. It also includes a description of the objection, notice, and hearing provisions,
and a statement that anyone who may be adversely affected will be given an opportunity
to comment in conformance with those provisions. Under the Rosebud Sioux Water
Code, the water committee, comprised of three members of the tribal council, are
responsible for providing notice. RosEauD Sioux WATER CODE § 6.5. In an effort to
free its Resources Committee from bureaucratic tasks, the Navajo Code assigns the
notice duties to the Water Director. NAVAJO TaRn. CODE tit. 22, § 1607.
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may be affected by the applicant's requested use."' Further, where a
user requests that her/his permit be amended or modified, the same
notice procedure for granting the permit should be followed. 3 2 Second,
notice should also be given to a user who may be in violation of the
code or specifications in her/his permit.3 53 Contents of the notice
should include the nature of the violation, the section of the code or
permit violated, and the time, date, and place of the hearing to
determine whether there is a violation.
354
Where a suspected violation is causing an immediate, ongoing harm,
the tribe may wish to give the enforcing agency the authority to take
351. The Rosebud Sioux Water Code provides that notice to affected persons includes
publication in the local newspapers, posting in the affected area, and mailing to persons
who may be adversely affected. RosEBUD SIOux WATER CODE §§ 6.5(6), 6.6(4) (1977).
The Navajo Water Code has identical provisions. NAvAjo TRm. CODE tit. 22, § 1608
(Supp. 1984-85).
If a party responds to the notice by objecting to the application within thirty days,
the applicant is given an opportunity to reply within thirty days and a hearing is held.
ROsEBUD Sioux WATER CODE §§ 6.8-.10. Objections and replies can be oral or in writing.
Id. §§ 6.8-.9. The code requires that objections and replies be inscribed on a form, by
the objector/applicant, or by the Water Administrator or capable personnel, from the
oral objections and replies. Id. The Navajo Code contains identical provisions. NAvAJO
TRm. CODE tit. 22, §§ 1609-1611.
The Umatilla tribes require that notice be given to every user within a one mile radius
from the proposed point of diversion. It then provides a reasonable time between the
time of the notice and hearing, if one is needed, for those persons to prepare to comment
for or against the application. It gives notice through direct mail and through publication
in a newspaper. Farrow & Skervin Interview, supra note 278.
352. See NAvAJo Tam. CODE tit. 22, § 1603 (Supp. 1984-85). The Code states:
Upon the effective date of this Code, all persons desiring to initiate new
uses of, or take other actions within the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation
affecting the waters herein shall file an Application for Permit as required
by this chapter. After such date, it shall be unlawful for any person to
make any new use or take any other action within the jurisdiction of the
Navajo Nation affecting the waters therein except as authorized by this
Code.
Id. The Rosebud Sioux Water Code allows modifications in accordance with the
procedures provided in the code. RosEauD SIoUx WATER CODE § 7.7 (1977).
353. NAVAOO TRm. CODE tit. 22, § 2002 (Supp. 1984-85); RosEnUD SIOUX WATER
CODE § 10.2 (1977); UMALL. INTRIM WATER CODE § XIV (1981).
354. ROSEBUD SIOUX WATER CODE §§ 10.1-10.9 (1977) (chapter 10, "General Hearing
Provisions"). This chapter describes the procedural process for the prosecution of code
and permit violations. It requires that a user suspected of violating the code be given
notice through registered mail. Id. § 10.2. Notice of the hearing is also published in a
newspaper in the area of the violation. Id.
This chapter describes the procedures for any hearing not otherwise provided for in
the code. By its organization, it requires and provides procedures above and beyond
those required for permit approvals. The Navajo Water Code is organized the same
way. See NAvAJo TRm. CODE tit. 22, §§ 2001-2009 (Supp. 1984-85) (subchapter 10,
"General Hearing Provisions").
The Umatilla Interim Water Code contains a separate, all-inclusive procedure for
prosecuting code violations. UMATuA INTERIM WATER CODE § XIV (1981).
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immediate corrective action to alleviate or ameliorate the harm. Such
action will include entry onto land to shut off or reduce the flow of
the suspected violator's diversion system."' Perhaps notice to the user
prior to entry is required, unless in the enforcing agent's reasoned
judgment the immediate need to enter and take corrective action
outweighs the user's right to notice and opportunity to be heard before
the corrective action is taken.1 6
Whether the individual is entitled to notice prior to tribal action is
an issue to be resolved by the tribal court following an ICRA com-
plaint.?" However, the tribe's ability to enforce its water code against
all users within the reservation will depend, in part, on non-Indians'
or non-tribal members' perception that the enforcement procedures are
fair."' A notice requirement prior to entry in order to take corrective
action, or at least a requirement that the tribal agent proceed under
a reasoned judgment that the harm caused by the use outweighs the
user's right to notice and hearing, plus an exploration of alternatives
to the outright shutdown of the delivery system and immediate post-
action hearing, will go far in alleviating users' fears."19 Corrective
action prior to notice should be the exception to the rule that the user
355. The Rosebud Sioux Water Code provides for the enforcement figency's entry
onto land of anyone using water on the reservation. RosEnuD Sioux WATEn CODE §
7.4 (1577). Further, every permit is required to contain the condition that the applicant
consents to "reasonable entry" upon his land. Id. What constitutes "reasonable entry"
is for the tribal court to determine. "Reasonable entry" may require notice beforehand,
or perhaps the reason for the entry must be reasonable. Entry for the purpose of
inspection is perhaps reasonable entry, but entry without notice to turn off a delivery
system may not be reasonable without notice in the absence of imminent harm. The
code should include an inclusive list of examples for what constitutes reasonable entry,
and what actions the enforcing agent may take once he gains entry.
356. Some western states have not yet encountered such a situation. See, e.g.,
Goodman Interview, supra note 325. South Dakota's water engineers have been able to
resolve complaints by talking to the suspected violator. The violator has then voluntarily
taken actions to correct any harm.
357. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); R.J. Williams Co. v.
Fort Belknap Housing Auth., 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983) (whether prejudgment writ
of attachment to non-Indians' property following dispute with tribal agency violates
ICRA is for the tribal court to determine).
358. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (seizure of property prior to notice
and hearing violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution).
359. State water engineers are allowed by law to enter property in order to shut off
headgates during times of scarcity. In doing so, they allocate the state's water among
users according to the state's priority system. Without quantification, tribal water
engineers would allocate a resource owned by both the state and tribe between members
and non-tribal members according to the tribe's priority system. Conflicts arise during
times of scarcity when tribal engineers enter non-Indian property to shut off non-Indian
users whose uses do not enjoy seniority under the tribe's priority system. Conflicts will
also arise when tribal water engineers enter non-Indian property to shut off water due
to perceived violations of the tribe's water quality provisions.
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is entitled to notice of his potential violation before any action is
taken.
(b) Hearings
Hearings satisfy the "opportunity to be heard" element of proce-
dural due process. Hearings are held to determine whether a permit
or modification of a permit should be granted or denied.36° A hearing
to determine whether there has been a violation of the code or permit
should also be held. The hearing should be open and a record preserved
in case an appeal is made.36'
Hearings are essential for a fair determination of an individual's
rights and the tribe's welfare. They are also expensive and consume a
great deal of time. 62 Exactly who may have standing to request a
hearing should be carefully considered by the tribe.
The permit applicant is afforded the opportunity for a hearing. 63
Any person who may be directly affected by the granting of a permit
or modification of an existing permit should also be afforded a
hearing.3" However, some codes provide restrictions for opportunities
to object to a proposed permit. 65
(c) Impartial Tribunal
Most tribal constitutions concentrate governmental power within the
tribal council.3 " This is especially true in regard to tribal governments
organized under the IRA. 67 Water codes generally follow this tendency.
360. The Umatilla Tribes' water director may approve or deny a domestic well permit
without a hearing. UMATILLA INTERIM WATER CODE § VI(E)(1) (1981). Hearings are
required where there are appeals from his decision. Id.
361. NAVAJo TRm. CODE tit. 22, § 2008 (Supp. 1984-85) (hearings are recorded, and
any person may bring a stenographer to the hearing). The Umatilla Water Code calls
for stenographic recording of any hearing. UumAL ITrrERIM WATR CODE § VI(E)(5)
(1981). The Rosebud Sioux Water Code does not require that recordation take place,
only that hearing should be recorded "Iwihenever possible." ROsEBUD Sioux WATER
CODE § 10.8 (1977).
362. Farrow & Skervin Interview, supra note 278.
363. NAvAjo TRIB. CODE tit. 22, § 1612 (Supp. 1984-85); ROSEBUD Sioux WATER
CODE § 6.10 (1977); UMATILLA INTERIM WATER CODE § VI(E)(2) (1981).
364. NAVAiO TRIB. CODE tit. 22, § 1609 (Supp. 1984-85); ROSEBUD SIOUX WATER
CODE § 6.7 (1977); UMATMLA INTERn WATER CODE § VI(E)(3)(b) (1981).
365. Cf. NAVAJO TRiB. CODE tit. 22, § 1612 (Supp. 1984-85); ROsEBUD SIoux WATER
CODE § 6.11 (1977) ("Any applicant directly affected or any party objecting in accordance
with this (sub)chapter may request and obtain as a matter of right a hearing .....
366. See, e.g., ROSEBUD Sioux TRIBE CoNsT. arts. III, IV.
367. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-470 (1988). The Rosebud Sioux Tribe Constitution originates
from this law. See ROSEBUD Sioux TmBE CONST. preamble; see also Ziontz, supra note
344; Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70
MICH. L. REv. 955 (1972).
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The regulatory entities that grant or deny permits and modifications,
or determine whether a code violation has occurred, are generally
composed of tribal council members.36 Their ability to operate inde-
pendently of the tribal council is a recurring issue that tribes may wish
to address.
The Umatilla tribes are considering the inclusion of a non-Indian as
a voting member of their water committee.3 69 They are also exploring
the possibility of hiring a "hearing officer," who is specially experi-
enced or trained in resolving water disputes, and could competently
take over hearings involving permit approvals and code violations from
the water committee.370 The water committee could then focus on its
role in formulating water policy.
2. Equal Protection
A tribe can write its code in a manner that provides for equal, fair
treatment of tribal and non-tribal members alike. The best way to do
this is to omit any language that prescribes preferential treatment for
tribal members or discriminatory, arbitrary treatment of non-tribal
members.
37 1
368. NAVAjO TRiB. CODE tit. 22, § 1308 (Supp. 1984-85) (Resources Committee,
composed of tribal councilmen selected by the chairman, is a standing committee of
the Na.vajo Tribal Council); Rosntuo Sioux WATER CODE § 3.1 (1977) (Water Committee
is composed of five members from the tribal council); UMATrILA INTRIM VATER CODE
§ XII (1981) OVater Committee is composed of members from the Board of Trustees).
The Navajo and Umatilla codes provide for a technical advisory committee to advise
the water committee. NAVAIO TRI. CODE tit. 22, §§ 1001-1006 (chapter 9, "Water
Development Technical Review Board"); UmTM.LA INTERIM WATER CODE § XI (1981)
("Technical Advisory Committee").
369. Farrow & Skervin Interview, supra note 278.
370. Id.
371. The Rosebud Sioux Water Code expressly mandated preferential treatment for
tribal members over non-tribal members. The applicable section states in full:
Whenever practicable, actions taken should benefit the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe and their (sic) members and further the objective for which the
Rosebud Sioux Reservation was created, namely, to provide a permanent
home and abiding place for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and their (sic)
members, both now and in the future. Alternatives to existing and proposes
(sic) uses are to be considered whenever practicable in order to achieve
this goal. Included in those alternatives shall be the option to restrict or
prohibit entirely any further use of water for any reason. If there is
presented to the Water Committee a conflict between the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe or any of its members with non-Tribal projects or uses, the Water
Committee will grant appropriate preference to the Tribe or its members
over non-Tribal projects or uses.
ROSEBUD SIOux VATER CODE § 5.1(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
This section not only discriminates against non-tribal members, it also condones the
discriminatory action for any reason, not only in cases where the presence of a compelling
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/4
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The Umatilla tribes administer permits to members and nonmembers
alike.372 The. only requirements for receiving a permit are (1) available
water that can be extracted without causing harm to an existing user,
and (2) compliance with the code's diversion and policy requirements.
73
The code does not contain language providing for different treatment
of non-tribal members. Further, if an Indian applicant's proposed
diversion would harm a non-Indian, the permit is either granted with
restrictions that protect the non-Indian or it is denied.
374
Furthermore, the Umatilla Reservation's Water Committee itself
recognizes the potential for racial bias.3 75 Like committees mandated
by other codes, the Umatilla Water Committee is composed of the
Umatilla Board of Trustees, the tribe's governing body. 376 As such,
the committee is affected by political conflicts. Conflicts that generate
preferential treatment for tribal members are more likely than political
pressure to engage in discriminatory treatment of non-tribal members.
It is difficult to deny a constituent's permit application; it is also
difficult for the committee to avoid ex parte contact and subsequent
preferential treatment of members when it rules on code violations.
3"
tribal interest exists.
The tribe's own tribunal will decide whether any provision in the code violates the
equal protection of ICRA. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 52 (1978).
However, the tribe may be forced to choose whether it wishes to exercise jurisdiction
over its territory within the reservation or promote its traditional views. See Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (tribal regulation prohibiting hunting and fishing
on fee lands within the reservation but permitting such activity on trust lands was not
enforceable over fee lands). Not only have such laws been struck down by the Supreme
Court; they contribute to the fashioning of "bad law" which is detrimental to long-
term tribal interests. See id.
372. The tribes' newly drafted code further attempts to eliminate the possibility of
racially oriented decisions. First, the new Water Committee will include a non-Indian.
Second, its role will be limited to policy-oriented matters only. Third, the number of
hearings will be reduced. Domestic wells will be approved or denied on the basis of
conformance to specific, comprehensive regulations, eliminating the need for a hearing.
The code provides for the obtaining of a variance and review of the regulations'
applicability. Fourth, hearings for nondomestic well permits, variances for domestic
wells, and code violations will be conducted by a "Hearing Officer", an individual
experienced or educated in hydrogeology who can fairly expedite such proceedings.
Water Resource officials recognize that it may not be possible to find such an individual.
Farrow & Skervin Interview, supra note 278. Due to budgetary constraints, the code
has not been enacted. Id.
373. Farrow Interview, Aug. 5, supra note 272. Most of the available water within
the Umatilla Reservation is groundwater. Compliance with diversion requirements re-
quires adherence to the tribes' well-drilling regulations. To date, 160 wells have been
drilled according to the tribe's code. Id.
374. Id.
375. Farrow Interview, Aug. 6, supra note 320.
376. UMATILLA INTERIM WATER CODE § XII(C) (1981).
377. Farrow Interview, Aug. 6, supra note 320.
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Basic due process protections discourage discriminatory treatment.
Mandatory recordation and open hearings create an atmosphere of
fairness, and aid the tribal court when it hears appeals from a water
committee's actions.
3 78
The strict notice and hearing provisions also serve the tribes' needs
by alleviating non-tribal members' fears that their rights would not be
respected by the tribes' judicial process. 79 The provisions help reduce
tension and instill trust that the code will be administered fairly and
evenhandedly. 80
H. Appeals
A tribe should consider whether, to what extent, and to which body
it should allow appeals from the Water Committee's decisions. It
should consider who may appeal, what can be reviewed, and the
standards for review that apply to each permissible cause of action.
In order to comply with the ICRA and, in some cases, a tribe's
own bill of rights, a board should be instituted to hear appeals from
the water committee's decisions. The Rosebud Sioux Water Code
requires that all appeals be taken to the Tribal Council.38' The Umatilla
code directs appeals to the tribal court.38 2 Appeals under the Navajo
code are heard by the Navajo Court of Appeals. 83
Tribal codes generally include the standards of review for an ap-
pellate court to apply. The standards of review fall into two categories.
First, the tribunal may review whether the water committee's decision
has a basis in fact; that is, whether its final determination was "ar-
bitrary and capricious." 31" A code may require that the agency's record
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. Id. Tribal officials feel that non-tribal members are confident enough in their
admini:tration to consider iess expensive due process procedures while maintaining the
same protections. Id.
381. ROsEBuD Sioux WATER CODE § 11.1 (1977). The code provides safeguards to
prevent a biased councilman, or one with an interest in the outcome, from sitting on
the appellate board. Id. § 11.2(2). It is acknowledged that a tribal council has the
authority to judge whether its acts violate the ICRA. See Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976). However, such concentration of power raises well-
known separation-of-power issues. Tribal court review may increase faith in the system
for both Indians and non-Indians.
382. UMATILLA INTERIM WATER CODE §§ XIV(E), XVII (1981).
383. NAVAJO TRIB. CODE tit. 22, § 2101 (Supp. 1984-85).
384. Id. § 2107 (arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence);
ROSEBuD Sioux WATER CODE § 11.8 (1977) (arbitrary and capricious); UMATILLA INTERIM
WATER CODE § XIV(E)(2) (1981) ("in accordance with tribal law"); cf. Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988). Federal courts give great deference to
agency decisions under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, and inevitably heighten
their scrutiny where the agency must provide "substantial evidence" to support its
decision. The tribe's appellate body, however, has the sovereign authority to define
these terms for itself.
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be supported by "substantial evidence.""38 Second, it may review the
agency's interpretation of the law as it applies to the facts. 86
Finally, the ICRA mandates that a person cannot be deprived of
equal protection under a tribe's laws, nor can a person be deprived
of property without due process of law.3  As such, an appellate body
has jurisdiction to hear equal protection and due process complaints
based on tribe's water agency's implementation or enforcement of its
code. A tribe may want to specify that its code is to be enforced
under the guidance of its bill of rights and the ICRA.
3 8
There is also a coercive reason for providing civil rights protections
to members and nonmembers. While federal court review is not avail-
able, the Department of the Interior has the capacity to review a tribe's
record regarding ICRA protections.389 Its review will not overturn tribal
court opinions, but may result in decreased funding for water-related
projects if the Department determines that individual civil rights are
not sufficiently protected.39
I. Penalties for Noncompliance
A tribe should take inventory of all methods to encourage compli-
ance with the code. The enforcement agency should concentrate on
education and communication to resolve complaints. 391
Where more coercive methods are necessary, tribal codes include
civil penalties. Criminal penalties may not be necessary when enforcing
a water code. Further, their inclusion might cause a state to resist
tribal regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians. 392
A water code is most easily enforced through restitution, remedial
action, fines, and injunctions against further violations or harm. In-
385. NAVAJO TSm. CODE tit. 22, § 2107 (Supp. 1984-85).
386. Federal courts accord no deference when reviewing questions of law. They
apply a "de novo" standard of review. See Martha Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards
of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. REv. 470, 475-76 (1988).
387. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1988).
388. See NAvAJo Tam. CODE tit. 22, § 1904 (Supp. 1984-85). There may be an
unavoidable future collision with the tribe's legitimate interest in deriving the benefit of
its waters through tribal or member use, and a non-tribal member's civil rights to equal
protection under tribal allocation laws, when reservation water reaches full appropriation.
Telephone Interview with Aaron Skervin, Water Manager, Umatilla Reservation (Aug.
6, 1991) [hereinafter Skervin Interview].
389. See Ziontz, supra note 344, at 28.
390. Id.
391. Farrow Interview, Aug. 5, supra note 272 (education is one of the Umatilla
Reservation Land and Resource Department's top priorities); Goodman Interview, supra
note 325 (practically every dispute is resolved by talking to the users).
392. See Holly v. Totus, 655 F. Supp. 548, 552-53 (E.D. Wash. 1983) (Holly 1) (the
penalties for noncompliance with the tribe's water code included six months in jail); cf.
RosEBuD SIOux WATER CODE §§ 13.2-.4 (1977) (violation of the tribe's water code may
result in incarceration for up to six months).
No. 2]
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junctions against unlawful use should match the harm caused. If one
person's lawful use is infringing on another's lawful use, a partial
injunction calling for a cutback of use should be explored. Perhaps
use,; at different times or at different water pressures, or a requirement
that the use involve less waste, can resolve the dispute. The emphasis
should be on solving problems, rather than enforcing the letter of the
code.
If a person is using too much water, an injunction against use over
and above what he is entitled to under his permit may resolve the
dispute. Other penalties can include requiring (1) payment for water
improperly used or polluted through improper use;393 (2) corrective or
remedial work;319 (3) restitution to all adversely affected parties; (4)
payment for all necessary remedial actions taken by an agency;3 95 (5)
payment of associated costs to enforce the violation;31 (6) modifying
terms of the permit;39 and (7) fines for each violation. 9
Serious or repeated violations may require suspension or revocation
of a permit.39 A combination of payment for unlawful use of water
and the administrative costs of taking remedial action and enforcement,
restitution to harmed parties, and fines may be combined with a
suspension. Failure to pay adjudicated costs and fines may invoke
suspension of a permit.
A tribe may want its penalty provision to include a reference to its
bill of rights and the ICRA.40 As with granting or denying a permit,
the requirements of procedural due process and equal protection must
be applied in order to validly suspend or revoke a permit.
J. Charging for Water: Permit Fees and Water Marketing
Every water code requires a permit application fee. Fees are levied
under two different principles. First, the fee should correspond to the
amount of time and expense that it takes to process the permit.401
393. NAvAjo TBRm. CoDE tit. 22, § 2305 (Supp. 1984-85).
394. UMATMLA INTERIM WATER CODE § XV(C)(1) (1981).
395. NAvAJo Tnm. CODE tit. 22, § 2305 (Supp. 1984-85).
396. Id.
397. UMATILLA INTEM WATER CODE § XV(C)(3) (1981).
398. ICRA allows the tribe to impose a fine of $5000 for conviction of a criminal
offense. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1988). An appropriate fine for a regulatory offense is
unclear. The Umatilla code provides for a minimum of $50 per "minor" violation to
a maximum of $1000, and $500 per "major" violation to a maximum of $5000. UMATILLA
INTmRIM WAEr CODE § XV(C)(4) (1981). The highest fine ever levied was $500. Skervin
Interview, supra note 388.
399. NAv-To Tgm. CODE tit. 22, § 2305 (Supp. 1984-85) (forfeiture or suspension
of rights to use water); ROSEBUD SIOux WATER CODE §§ 13.4-.5 (1977) (forfeiture of
all rights to use water).
400. NAv Jo TAra. CODE tit. 22, § 2305 (Supp. 1984-85).
401. The Umatilla fee schedule provides that the application fee for a domestic well
costs $30, based on the cost to inspect the well before final approval. Final approval
costs another $10. Farrow Interview, Aug. 6, supra note 320.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/4
No. 21 COMMENTS
Second, the fee should reflect the amount of water to be diverted.
Some codes require fees on a sliding scale for water to be used for
agriculture purposes.4 Other codes charge one fee, and do not distin-
guish between permits for domestic, agricultural, or other water uses.403
Some codes provide for a waiver of the filing fee upon proof of
financial hardship by the applicant. 4" The fee should be applied evenly
to tribal and non-tribal members alike; failure to do so will raise the
issue of whether a tribe is violating the "equal protection" clause in
the ICRA.
A tribe should not expect that its enforcement agency can be funded
by the fees or fines that it collects. However, charging for the water
or levying a use tax have been considered by various tribes. The issue
of water marketing generates much hostility from non-Indian users,
especially when the issue is off-reservation marketing of water.05 This
issue is more important when the reserved right is quantified. The
402. The Umatilla fee schedule requires a $50 fee for the first 30 acres to be
irrigated; thereafter it charges $.30 per acre. Id.
403. NAvAJo TaRn. CODE tit. 22, § 1606 (Supp. 1984-85) ($25 filing fee); ROSEBUD
SIoux WATER CODE § 6.4 (1977) ($5 filing fee).
404. NAvAJo TRE. CODE tit. 22, § 1606 (Supp. 1984-85); ROSEBUD Sioux WATER
CODE § 6.4 (1977).
405. State advocates are generally hostile to the sale of such rights. See Jack D.
Palma II, Considerations and Conclusions Concerning the Transferability of Indian
Water Rights, 20 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 91, 95 (1980); see also Rusinek, supra note 1, at
398 (Supreme Court questioned the right of tribes to sell water it cannot consumptively
use); In re Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River, 753 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo. 1988) (Big
Horn 1) (tribes can sell water on the reservation; sale of water off-reservation was not
at issue), aff'd by an equally divided Supreme Court per curiam, 492 U.S. 406, reh'g
denied, 492 U.S. 938 (1989). But see SLY, supra note 56, at 30 (Fort Peck Agreement
provides for off-reservation marketing of reserved water with notice and state partici-
pation in benefits). See generally Getches, From Conflict to Pragmatism, supra note
117.
The Reagan administration supported water settlements that provided for the mar-
keting of Indian water rights as a way to pay for quantification proceedings. SLY, supra
note 56, at 132. The federal government has encouraged and participated in the free
water policy. See generally DONALD WORSTER, RivERS OF EMIRE: WATER, ARrirrY, AN
THE GROWTH OF TE AmERICAN WEST (1985). Federal water projects heavily subsidized
western states' growth by providing cheap electricity and water. Id. These projects have
proceeded with little or no regard for tribal needs or participation. See generally McCool,
supra note 1. In sum, states oppose the sale of tribal water because they would rather
use it for free.
States have proceeded under the policy that water is free for those who will expend
the resources to develop it. Social policy dictates that the sale of a scarce resource that
is vital to survival should not be allocated according to market resources. See MEYERS,
supra note 335, at 45-46. Another purpose of this approach is to remove the cost of
water as an obstacle to economic development. Id. at 49-50. The assumption is that
increased revenue from property taxes, personal and business income taxes, and sales
taxes more than compensate for any money that could be raised by selling water to
prospective users. Id.
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code. can be enacted without a provision regarding the sale of reserved
water.
If a tribe wants to tax the use of reserved water, it should review
its ability to collect the tax.406 Quantification may be necessary to
prove tribal ownership of the water use it wishes to tax. Like charging
for water, this issue can be left out of the code and enacted in a later
ordinance.
K. Method of Enforcement: The Permit System
When a tribe decides to enact a water code, it should decide how
it wants to enforce it. The prevalent method requires users to apply
for a permit in order to use the tribe's water.4 The permit applicant
discloses extensive information about the proposed use. Applications
request that the applicant reveal the following: the applicant's name,
address, source of water the applicant will divert from, a map of the
diversion and land surrounding it, a legal description accompanying
the map, the exact location of the point of diversion, the method of
the diversion, the purpose for diversion, how much water the applicant
will use, an estimate of return flow, if any, the anticipated change in
water quality or temperature, and the estimated date that the applicant
will actually divert the water.4 If the proposed use is for irrigation,
the user should describe the land it will be applied to and the owner's
name of that land.4
The regulatory agency may want to test the water that is to be
diverted for its compatibility with the proposed use. Particularly, it
may wish to have soil analysis performed to determine the land's
ability to process the water and assess the quality of the return flow.
410
Most water codes issue permanent licenses that are appurtenant to
the land upon which the water is applied.41 However, the Umatilla
406. Cf. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982) (the tribe has
authority to levy a severance tax against nonmembers for oil and gas removed from
tribal lands). It will be much easier to collect the tax from non-tribal members who use
water within the reservation.
407. NAVAJO TaRI. CODE tit. 22, § 1603 (Supp. 1984-85); RosEnuD SIOUX WATER
CODE § 6.1 (1977); UMATILL INTERIM WATER CODE § V (1981). The Colville Reservation
also employs the permit method. The permit system is the prevailing method for
regulating the use of water on reservations. It is also the most prevalent method among
the we-stern states. GETcHns, NuTsmLn, supra note 24, at 94.
408. NAVAJO TaRs. CODE tit. 22, § 1604 (Supp. 1984-85); RosEBUD SIOux WATER
CODE § 6.1 (1977); UMATILA INTERIM WATER CODE § VI(G)(c) (1981).
409. UMATILLA INTERIM WATER CODE § VI(G)(c)(v) (1981).
410. Cf. S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. §§ 46-5-6.2 to -6.10 (1987) (requiring that a
soil/water compatibility permit application be submitted to the state's Division of
Conservation for, approval).




code provides for the expiration of each permit five years after its
approval.412 The permit is renewable. The purpose for the Umatilla's
five year limitation is to give the tribe the flexibility in balancing its
future demands against the utility of the permittee's use of the water.
413
The tribe also has the flexibility to more effectively refine and adapt
its zoning laws without having to plan around permanent water uses.
414
Some uses are licensed for twenty years to provide the user with the
amount of time necessary to receive a reasonable return on the user's
water diversion and application investments. 41 When a tribe devises a
comprehensive zoning plan that requires no major future changes, the
need to issue renewable permits will disappear.
L. Existing Users
After enacting a water code, the most important activity that a
regulatory agency performs is compiling a list of every existing user
on the reservation. The list should be comprehensive. A tribe should
decide whether to conduct hearings to approve or deny the continuance
of each existing use or whether to "grandfather" (waive such require-
ment) the uses.
The Navajo Nation's experience emphasizes the importance of this
first step of cataloging existing users. The Navajo Nation's water code
required de novo scrutiny of all existing uses at the time its code was
enacted. 4 6 As a result, the tribe was not able to enforce compliance
among non-tribal members. The result of this situation is that the code
has not been regularly enforced since its enactment in 1984; 417 subse-
quent water use has not conformed to any sort of plan.
418
The Umatilla tribe, on the other hand, made a policy decision in
1981 to accept the status quo of existing uses on the reservation. 4 9 In
412. UMATUiA INTEiM WATER CODE § VI(H)(l) (1981).
413. Farrow Interview, Aug. 6, supra note 320.
414. Id. Temporary permits and variances are also available to prevent dislocation.
Id. Further, a permittee may seek renewal term longer than five years. UmAramLA INTERIM
WATER CODE § VI(H)(5) (1981).
415. Id.
416. NAvo TR, . CODE tit. 22, §§ 1601-1605 (Supp. 1984-85). Under the code, an
existing user was required to file a "description of use" relating to the user's current
appropriation within one year of the code's enactment. Id. § 1602. The user received
an "interim permit" for a "reasonable quantity" of water pending approval of the
user's application for a permit under the Navajo Water Code. Id. §§ 1603, 1605. The
user's application was then processed in the same manner as an application for a new
use. rd. § 1603. The Rosebud Sioux Water Code follows an identical procedure. RosEBUD
Sioux WATER CODE §§ 6.1-6.5 (1977) (chapter 6, "Applications for Permits").
417. Becker Interview, supra note 325.
418. Id.
419. Nash Address, supra note 273, at 82-83. The Umatilla Interim Water Code
asserted tribal control but accepted the existing uses as they were. UmATsLA INTERIM
WATER CODE § IV(C) (1981). Any new uses required tribal permits. Id. § V.
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doiag so, it determined that jurisdiction over its reservation would not
accrue immediately, but would result from a series of steps taken with
the acknowledgment of existing users' rights. 420 The existing uses were
"grandfathered" for the life of the interim code. 42' The tribe contem-
plated that a permanent code would be enacted within a number of




The Colville water code also "grandfathered" all existing uses.
4
2
Users under state permits were allowed to submit their perniits as
proof of the quantity and priority of their claims. Those claims were
then incorporated into the tribes' permit system. 424
In sum, a tribe should concentrate its resources on compiling existing
use information to be filed in its offices. It will then be in a better
position to manage its water and resolve disputes between users. New
permit applications, or proposed changes in existing uses by non-tribal
members, are determined by the tribe, not the state.4 2" Providing
42.0. Nash Address, supra note 273, at 83.
421. UUATMLA INrM WATER CODE § IV(C) (1981).
422. See supra note 372 (discussing the tribes' comprehensive code, drafted in 1986
but not enacted due to insufficient funds).
423. Pasmore Interview, July 2, supra note 265. The BIA hired an independent
contractor to catalogue all the existing users. Id.
424. Under an agreement with the state of Washington, state permit applications
from nonmembers on fee lands are on "hold." Telephone Interview with Jim Lyerla,
Department of Water Resources, State of Washington (Aug. 6, 1991).
425. See Nash Address, supra note 273, at 82. Keeping track of proposed changes
in existing use by non-tribal members will be a bureaucratic challenge. A method to
keep abreast of filings with the state should be developed since non-tribal members may
not attempt to comply with the tribal code, or may not know that they should comply
with it.
If the non-tribal member applies to the state for a new permit or to change an existing
use, the tribe should lodge a complaint that the state does not have the jurisdiction to
make such a determination. The complaint should be filed (in conformance with the
state's administrative proceeding which would approve or deny the permit) in federal
or distxict court, or both. Such a complaint may begin a jurisdictional dispute, as was
the case in Brendale. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 414 (1989). A tribe's ability to show that it effectively administers
its code will be a strong factor in any final outcome.
If a tribe has quantified its entitlement it may want to require users of unused water
to file a permit with the tribe. In order to do this, the tribe would have to closely
monitor state permits in order to determine whether the state's share of "excess" water
was fully appropriated. Next, the tribe would probably have to obtain a favorable ruling
in federal court that junior appropriators cannot divert unused tribal reserved water in
the sane manner that they divert unappropriated state water; that is, junior appropriators
must file for a tribal permit to use reserved water, not the state's water code. Compare
United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1365 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Any permits issued
by the state would be limited to excess water. If those permits represent rights that may
be empty, so be it.") with Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46
(9th Cir. 1981) (unused reserved water is available for appropriation by non-Indians),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss2/4
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continuity of use to non-tribal members may not be palatable, but it
avoids immediate, protracted litigation involving jurisdictional, due
process, equal protection, and laches issues.426 Given the backdrop of
Brendale, a theoretical fight over jurisdiction at the inception of a
tribal code is less likely to result in tribal regulatory authority over a
code that has already been fairly enforced over a substantial period
of time.
Where state law sanctions a use that collides with a tribal use and
results in harm, the issue of which law applies, and which forum may
hear the complaint, is an issue that is constantly disputed. Tribal courts
are competent to hear and resolve such issues.427 Federal court is
available as a last resort to determine whether the tribal court has
overstepped its jurisdiction. 478
The Walton court did not state whether appropriators of unused reserved water should
apply with the tribes or the state. Id. The hydrological circumstances of the basin in
Walton required that non-Indian users of excess water file with the tribe. Id. at 51.
426. As a practical matter, courts will not want to shut off junior appropriators'
beneficial use of water without a showing by the tribe that it needs the water. Under
Brendale, the Supreme Court has asserted that it does not favor the curtailment of non-
tribal members' economic development within the reservation. Brendale, 492 U.S. at
429-31. Since a tribe has no need to demand water at this time, there is no need to
litigate an issue that results in depriving non-Indian users of water. Asserting that non-
Indians are illegally using the water without a permit invites litigation.
Information regarding non-tribal members' existing use within the reservation can be
obtained from the state's regulatory authority. The information on the state permits
can be transferred to tribal forms. The state permits should be kept for verification in
case there are any errors in the transcribing process.
The non-tribal member user should be given the opportunity to ratify the information
contained on the state permit, with the intended effect that the user attests that it
accurately describes the user's use and fulfilis the user's duty to comply with the tribe's
permit requirement. A consent form should be created, which gives the non-tribal
member the opportunity to allow the information on the state permit to constitute
compliance with the tribe's permit requirement. This makes compliance extremely easy
for the non-tribal member, and may constitute a "waiver" of the non-tribal member's
right to assert that the tribe does not have jurisdiction over non-tribal member's use of
water.
427. The tribal court may be able to apply, or at least interpret, state law in tribal
court to augment its claim or enjoin the harm where the priorities of use are the same.
Who wins an appeal in federal court is sometimes determined by who has the most
equitable claim. The probability of prevailing is greatest when a tribe can demonstrate
a history of cooperation and fairness. Rather than forcing the confrontation, a tribe
should proceed by fairly and equitably enforcing its code. If the federal court system
denies jurisdiction, it can explore its quantification alternative to help eliminate disputes
relating to shortages or overuse of water.
428. See, e.g., National Farmers Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Iowa
Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987). See generally Pommersheim, supra
note 113; Clayton, supra note 3.
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M. Water Quality: The Need for Specific Regulations
Most tribal codes address water quality issues in a practical fashion.
For example, the Umatilla Interim Water Code creates a statutory
cause of action for "nuisance" activities relating to pollution of the
reservation's waters. 42 Apparently, both the regulatory agency and an
individual may bring suit against a polluter under the interim code.430
Technicians from the Rosebud Sioux Office of Water Resources
routinely test the reservation's waters for pollutants such as nitrates,
sodium, and bacteria with an eye toward protecting the tribes' drinking
water.43' Tribal codes give the water committees discretion to minimize
pollution, thermal degradation, and "interaquifer communication.
' 412
Since most code sections are so vague, regulations are necessary to
define the unacceptable levels of pollution; this provides a scientific
and defensive basis for prosecuting violations.
43
Jurisdiction to enforce the Clean Water Act (CWA)434 and Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)45 over Indians in Indian
country4 6 belongs to the EPA or tribes, if they demonstrate that they
possess enforcement capabilities. 437 The states are not authorized to
enforce either act against Indians on tribal lands. 48 The water directors
from the Colville, Umatilla, and Rosebud Sioux reservations agree that
the cost of tribal enforcement of the CWA or RCRA is too high. 439
If a user violates the acts, the tribes rely on the EPA to enforce its
regulations and clean up any spills.
429. UMATILLiA ITRImm WATm CODE § IX (1981).
430. Id.
431. Telephone Interview with Syed Huq, Director, Office of Water Resources,
Rosebud Sioux Reservation (Aug. 6, 1991) [hereinafter Huq Interview, Aug. 6].
432. NAvAJo TaRm. CODE tit. 22, § 1502(11)-(13) (Supp. 1984-85); RosEBu Sioux
WATER CODE § 5.2(12)-(13) (1977).
433. Regulations regarding well drilling effectively address interaquifer pollution
caused by improperly sealed wells. Farrow Interview, Aug. 5, supra note 272. The
Umatilla Reservation Department of Natural Resources will shut down wells that cause
such interaquifer contamination. Id.
4:14. 33 U.S.C.S. §§ 1251-1387 (Law. Co-op 1987 & Supp. 1992).
4.15. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 6901-6992 (Law. Co-op 1982 & Supp. 1992).
4:16. "Indian country" is defined by Congress to include "all land within the limits
of any Indian reservation under jurisdiction of the United States' government, notwith-
standing the issuance of any patent .... ." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
437. See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Indian Policy Implementation Guidance
(Nov. 8, 1984); U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, EPA Policy for the Administration of
Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984). Both of these docu-
ments are cited in DAVID H. GE'rcHs & CHwuns F. WnNsoN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
535 (1986).
438. See Washington Dep't of Ecology v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency,
752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
439. Pasmore Interview, July 2, supra note 265; Farrow Interview, Aug. 5, supra
note 272; Huq Interview, Aug 6, supra note 431.
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N. Civil Law Alternative
Water regulations are intended to promote efficient growth while
curtailing the need for individuals to resort to their common-law
remedies when two uses are in conflict. The tribe may wish to enact
specific civil laws that provide jurisdiction for nuisance and strict-
liability claims against any user who causes harm to another at the
same time that it enacts a water code.40
Such laws would remove the jurisdictional issue from the criminal/
prohibitory sphere and place it into the civil/regulatory sphere, where
support for tribal jurisdiction remains strong."' The laws can be written
to complement the water code in a way that maintains tribal court
jurisdiction over water disputes in the event that tribal territorial
jurisdiction is struck down. The tribe may need to organize its irrigation
operations as distinct legal entities, or tribal "corporations," which
operate independently from tribal government in order to sue as private
parties." 2
Perhaps the tribe can subrogate private complainants and sue in
their name. A tribe's water department may serve as a source of
evidence to support a tribal member's or entity's civil claim. The
agency's role would be more akin to that of a court-appointed expert." 3
The agency's information should be available to the non-tribal member
defendant if it is requested. In sum, so long as the tribal party can
distance itself from tribal government, it should be able to maintain
a civil suit.
IV. Summary
This comment is intended to provide a practical overview of the
issues regarding tribal water rights in the West. There are no easy
answers; water issues in the West are cast in a reality of water shortage.
All water disputes past and future, between tribes and states or tribes
and users within the reservation, are necessarily over the allocation
and use of a scarce resource.
It is important that tribes enact enforceable laws which give them
control over the use of water within their reservation boundaries. The
essence of sovereignty is the ability to control a people's destiny. Lack
of control over the most precious resource in the West - and known
to mankind - means lack of power to control tribal destiny.
440. UMATILLA INTEIM WATER CODE § IX (1981) ("Contamination or Pollution").
441. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); see also National Farmers Ins. Co
v. Crow Tribes, 471 U.S. 845 (1985); Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. La Plante, 480 U.S. 9
(1987).
442. Enactment of civil laws relating to water use will only strengthen tribal sover-
eignty. See Pommersheim, supra note 113.
443. Cf. FED. R. Evm. 706.
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This first part of this comment dealt with jurisdiction issues relating
to water rights and use within the reservation. Tribes must be able to
meet jurisdictional challenges in order to control their water resource
and their own destiny. Such challenges may be met by quantifying the
right, through either litigation or negotiation, and enacting a water
code which serves as a legitimate enforcement mechanism. Such com-
prehensive codes solidify tribal sovereignty and preserve a vital tribal
resource.
The second part of this comment addressed specific language that
tribes may wish to consider when enacting water codes. Since each
tribe has different circumstances and needs, each water code should
reflect these differences. It addressed a variety of options a tribe may
pursue when tailoring a code to match its distinct reality. It also
included a discussion of the realities that all tribes hold in common,
such as sovereignty and the need for adequate legal mechanisms of
enforcement. Exertion of control over tribal water in the West has
been met with stiff resistance. States have battled to prevent both
ownership and jurisdiction in order to preserve their own dominion
over this same resource for economic expansion. As such, control over
waler is an economic as much as legal issue, and the Supreme Court
has continually acknowledged that state economic development can
unhinge the tribes' legal right to their entitlement. Hopefully, both
parts of this comment will aid in the enactment of effective, enforceable
water codes to meet the states' unceasing challenge and to strengthen
sovereignty over tribal resources and territory.
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